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CAUTION AHEAD
FOLLOWING THE DEVASTATION OF SUPERSTORM SANDY IN OCTOBER 2012, NEW 
York City’s essential infrastructure needs were made a top policy priority for the first time 
in decades. The scale and severity of the storm prompted numerous studies to assess the 
damage and led policymakers to take steps to shore up the city’s coastal infrastructure 
weaknesses. Although that work remains imperative, New York City faces a number of other 
infrastructure vulnerabilities that have little to do with storm preparedness or resiliency. If 
left unchecked, they could wreak as much havoc on the city’s economy, competitiveness and 
quality of life as the next big storm. 
New York City’s core infrastructure is in dramatically better shape than it was in the 
1980s, when the city closed the Williamsburg Bridge for fear of collapse, track fires were 
a regular occurrence in the subway system and the Brooklyn Bridge, FDR Drive and West 
Side Highway all experienced structural failures. Yet, as we detail in this report, much of the 
city’s roads, bridges, subways, water mains, sewer systems, school buildings and other public 
buildings are more than 50 years old, and many critical components are past their useful life 
and highly susceptible to breaks and malfunctions. 
Over 1,000 miles of New York City water mains are more than 100 years old, leading 
to frequent and disruptive breaks. More than 160 bridges across the five boroughs were 
built over a century ago, and in 2012 47 bridges were deemed both structurally deficient 
and fracture critical, a designation engineers use for bridges that have little structural 
redundancy, making them prone to failure and collapse. The subway’s aging signaling 
system—with 269 miles of mainline signals exceeding their 50-year useful life—slows the 
movement of trains and forces maintenance workers to build their own replacement parts 
because manufacturers no longer make them. Additionally, more than 200 of the city’s public 
school buildings were built before 1920.  
Simply put, too much of the city’s essential infrastructure remains stuck in the 20th 
Century—a problem for a city positioning itself to compete with other global cities in today’s 
21st Century economy. 
While the Bloomberg administration increased capital spending significantly and made 
great strides on a number of important fronts, it put more emphasis on new construction 
than bringing older assets into a state of good repair. The city Department of Transportation 
(DOT) fell behind on street repaving, for instance, while the Department of Environmental 
Protection (DEP) lost ground on its own water main replacement targets—even as the city 
funded the first new water tunnel in nearly a century. Although the School Construction 
Authority dramatically increased the number of public school seats, the maintenance and 
repair of many older buildings suffered during this period. 
This report finds that city agencies and authorities will have to invest approximately 
$47.3 billion to maintain the safety and functioning of New York’s infrastructure—leaving a 
$34.2 billion capital funding gap at the city, Port Authority1, New York City Transit, Housing 
Authority and CUNY over the next five years. This funding gap includes only the replacement 
and repair of existing infrastructure—not new structures or increased capacity.2
To remain a magnet for global businesses and talent, and to ensure the high quality of 
life current residents have come to expect, Mayor Bill de Blasio, Governor Andrew Cuomo 
and other government officials will need to make investing in the city’s aging infrastructure 
a major priority. Although it will not be easy in an era of diminished federal funds, this report 
outlines several achievable solutions for addressing New York’s critical infrastructure needs.
This report provides a comprehensive exami-
nation of New York City’s current infrastructure 
vulnerabilities. It goes beyond the coastal infra-
structure challenges that were exposed after Su-
per Storm Sandy and offers a new level of detail 
about the current state of the city’s infrastructure 
in a broad range of critical—but often neglected—
areas, including roads and bridges, subways, air-
ports, the electricity distribution system, natural 
gas service pipes, water mains, sewage pipes and 
the broadband network. Additionally, the report 
takes a close look at the state of New York’s civic 
infrastructure, including parks, schools, home-
less shelters, CUNY facilities, public hospitals, 
libraries, public housing and courthouses. Based 
on extensive data analysis and interviews with 
more than 100 infrastructure experts in New York 
and around the nation, the report also puts forth 
a number of recommendations on what city and 
state officials can do to address the infrastructure 
deficiencies outlined in the report.
Much of New York City’s skeletal infrastruc-
ture dates from the first part of the 20th century. 
As a result, many structures have been in con-
tinual service for over half a century. The aver-
age age of New York City’s 6,400 miles of sewage 
mains is approximately 84 years, for example. Its 
6,800 miles of water mains are approximately 69 
years old, and its 6,300 miles of gas mains are 56 
years old. Over 41 percent of city bridges were 
built before 1950.
 “In some cases, the infrastructure in New York 
is so old we don’t even know where it is under the 
street,” notes city planner and historian Alexan-
der Garvin. “There can be a water main break in 
lower Manhattan and our engineers won’t be able 
to find it.” 
Many of the city’s gas, steam, sewer and wa-
ter lines are made of old and outmoded materials 
like unlined cast iron, making them highly sus-
ceptible to leaks and breaks. Largely because of 
leaks, over 2 percent of the gas Con Edison sends 
to customers every year never makes it to its final 
destination.3 The difference between the amount 
of water that enters the city’s water delivery sys-
tem and the amount consumed by customers is a 
staggering 24 percent, about double the 10 to 15 
percent industry standard. 
Since 1998, New York has experienced at least 
400 water main breaks in all but one year; in 2013, 
there were 403. Although most of the breaks are 
minor, serious ruptures are an annual occurrence. 
Already this year, a major water main break on 
13th Street in Manhattan flooded the street and 
nearby subways.4 (In 2013, a similar incident par-
alyzed the subways at 23rd Street in south Mid-
town5 and, in 2012, a major break occurred near 
Penn Station.6) 
“We’re probably going to see more water 
mains that burst because of fatigue cracks,” notes 
Sam Schwartz, a renowned transportation engi-
neer and former New York City traffic commis-
sioner.
The city’s 1,445 bridges and 19,000 lane miles 
of roads and highways also concern engineers. 
Eleven percent of New York City bridges—162 in 
all—have been deemed structurally deficient, and 
47 bridges have been found to be both structur-
WHAT IS INFRASTRUCTURE?
In this report, we use the word “infrastructure” loosely to cover traditional, horizontal systems such 
as roads, sewage system and electrical grid as well as vertical assets used by the New York City Housing 
Authority (NYCHA), City University of New York (CUNY) and the public hospitals. The management 
and maintenance of these systems is divided among a number of public and private entities, including 
state and city agencies, public authorities and private, regulated companies. Funding sources vary 
depending on the system, with large portions of money coming from federal tax revenues (e.g. public 
housing), city and state government tax revenues (e.g. public schools) and individual consumers 
(electricity, broadband, transit and water).
Center for an Urban Future Caution Ahead4
ally deficient and fracture critical. The bridges in 
this latter category not only suffer from signifi-
cant distress, they lack sufficient redundancy to 
withstand that distress. According to engineers, if 
a single span, beam or joint of such a bridge fails, 
the whole thing could come tumbling down. 
Meanwhile, the city DOT has deemed 30.4 
percent of the city’s roads to be in “fair” or “poor” 
condition, up from 15.7 percent in 2000. Roughly 
43 percent of all roads in Manhattan are consid-
ered substandard, followed by Staten Island (40 
percent), the Bronx (34 percent), Queens (31 per-
cent) and Brooklyn (28 percent). This is cause for 
concern: The longer the pavement goes without 
rehabilitation, the faster it begins to deteriorate 
and the more costly it becomes to fix.
“Arguably city streets are in the worst shape 
of any of our transportation infrastructure—and 
that says a lot.” says Elliot Sander, former execu-
tive director of the Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority (MTA) and current president and CEO 
of the HAKS Group, a construction management 
firm. “While a lot of resurfacing our streets has 
been done, they need to be fully reconstructed on 
a much wider scale, rather than just having as-
phalt poured on top as a patch. The resurfacing 
program is helpful, but it is basically an over-
used Band-Aid, which anyone who uses the city’s 
streets can attest to.” 
The city’s transit infrastructure has undoubt-
edly come a long way since the 1980s when sub-
ways broke down at a much higher rate than they 
do now, but the MTA’s 659 track miles of subway 
demand substantial attention, particularly with 
antiquated subway stations and outmoded signals 
that regulate the movement and spacing of trains. 
Of the system’s 728 miles of mainline signals, 269 
have exceeded their 50-year useful life and 26 
percent are more than 70 years old.7
With over 2,600 buildings bigger than 10,000 
square feet, New York City is one of the larg-
est landlords in the world. And as with the city’s 
horizontal infrastructure, a large percentage of 
these buildings suffer from old age and serious 
physical defects. For example, with over 370 of the 
city’s 12,000 public school buildings predating the 
Great Depression, temperamental heating and 
cooling systems, leaky roofs, and broken eleva-
tors are common. Citywide, 36 different building 
exteriors, 4 electrical systems and 69 mechanical 
systems are in need of immediate preventative 
maintenance.  
Similarly daunting capital challenges exist at 
many of the city’s 24 CUNY campuses, where the 
average building is 52 years old.
NYCHA’s physical needs were in the spotlight 
in the wake of Super Storm Sandy when tens of 
thousands of residents spent weeks without heat 
or running water. But NYCHA’s problems go be-
yond storm resiliency. With an average age of 
nearly 50 years and a long history of underfund-
ing, the majority of the authority’s 2,600 buildings 
suffer from serious physical distress. A staggering 
1,500 or 58 percent do not comply with the Depart-
ment of Building’s façade standards, as detailed 
in Local Law 11. Extreme temperatures, collapsed 
ceilings and persistent mold have left nearly 800 
units vacant and uninhabitable—and 319 of these 
have been empty for over seven years.
In addition, the average public hospital in the 
city is 57 years old, over half of the clinics oper-
ated by the city’s Department of Health and Men-
tal Hygiene were built before 1950, 61 percent of 
city-owned courthouses were constructed prior to 
 “In some cases, the infrastructure in New York is so old 
we don’t even know where it is under the street ... there 
can be a water main break in lower Manhattan and our 
engineers won’t be able to find it.”
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1940, and the 55 shelters operated by the city’s 
Department of Homeless Services are more than 
70 years old, on average. 
Bringing all these physical assets into a state 
of good repair will require a nearly unprecedent-
ed investment by the city, state and federal gov-
ernments. According to the city’s Asset Informa-
tion Management System (AIMS) report, just 18 
city agencies have $6.3 billion8 worth of so-called 
state of good repair needs over the next four 
years, including $3.2 billion at DOT, $1.3 billion 
at the Department of Education (DOE), $471 mil-
lion at the Department of Parks, and $282 million 
at the Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC). 
In a recent building condition assessment survey, 
CUNY itemized $2.5 billion in immediate capital 
needs, 11 times more than what is outlined in the 
city’s FY2014 AIMS report. And, in their five-year 
capital plans, NYCHA, New York City Transit and 
the Port Authority identified $15.5 billion, $16.3 
billion and $6.8 billion9 in state of good repair 
needs, respectively.
That comes to a total cost of $47.3 billion over 
the next four to five years. And this only reflects 
repairing and maintaining current infrastruc-
ture—not needed service expansions such as 
building new sewers or bus rapid transit lines.  
The enormous backlog of needs goes back de-
cades and is partly attributable to the lack of ade-
quate investment over many years. Between 2002 
and 2013, Mayor Michael Bloomberg increased 
city capital spending significantly over what the 
three previous mayors spent during their tenures. 
At the DEP, the construction of Water Tunnel 3 
was reinvigorated after years of neglect, and the 
School Construction Authority expanded public 
schools by 126,000 seats. Major new parks were 
built and the number 7 train will be extended to 
the far west side of Manhattan using city capital 
dollars. 
Still, when it came to maintaining existing 
assets, a number of New York City agencies lost 
ground during the Bloomberg administration. Ac-
cording to AIMS, between Fiscal Year 2009 and 
Fiscal Year 2014, capital needs at the Department 
of Correction grew by 181 percent, at HHC by 72 
percent, DOE by 71 percent and the Department 
of Homeless Services by 47 percent. According 
to its own assessment, CUNY’s backlog of needs 
went from $1.7 billion in 2007 to $2.5 billion in 
2012, a 47 percent jump. 
Though DOT capital needs increased by a 
more modest 8 percent over the last five years, 
the agency has resurfaced an average of only 852 
lane miles of road a year since 2000, even though 
an estimated 1,000 lane miles fall out of good re-
pair every year. Similarly, to stave off water main 
breaks, experts believe that the DEP should fol-
low a 100-year replacement cycle, which would 
mean replacing the equivalent of 68 miles of wa-
ter mains every year. But the agency has failed to 
reach this target a single time over the last decade.
There is a huge gap across the board between 
the backlog of the city’s capital needs and funding 
levels. Based on accumulated funding gaps and 
shortfalls in upcoming capital plans, unmet “state 
of good repair” needs will reach $34.2 billion over 
the next five years. This includes deferred capi-
tal maintenance at the New York City Transit Au-
thority ($10.5 billion)10 and CUNY ($2.5 billion) 
and projected shortfalls at NYCHA ($14 billion), 
Port Authority ($3.9 billion) and 18 city agencies 
($3.3 billion).
To overcome this enormous backlog, the re-
port urges Mayor de Blasio to make a significant 
new infrastructure investment and refocus the 
city’s capital spending on state of good repair 
needs. Ramping up the city’s investment will not 
be easy without additional resources from Albany 
and Washington, something that seems unlikely 
at the moment given the paralysis in Congress. 
But the report suggests that a major public works 
program to tackle the city’s aging infrastructure 
could be one of the most effective ways to create 
middle-income jobs in the five boroughs, a clear 
policy goal of the de Blasio administration. 
The report recommends several possibilities 
for new dedicated revenue sources to pay for in-
frastructure projects—including a Surface Water 
Management Fee, tolls on the East River bridges 
and a residential parking permit program—as 
well as  new mechanisms to capture the value cre-
ated by infrastructure projects. It calls on city and 
state officials to end the practice of diverting ex-
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isting dedicated revenue streams from the transit 
system, airports and the water system. 
To ensure that the city’s limited capital dollars 
go farther, state and city officials will also need to 
reduce the cost of construction on capital projects. 
Public sector construction projects in New York 
cost more and take longer than equivalent work 
in the private sector; they also tend to cost signifi-
cantly more than equivalent work by public sec-
tor agencies in other cities. For instance, in 2012 
replacing or repairing public school electrical and 
mechanical systems in New York City cost 67 per-
cent more than in Denver, 46 percent more than 
in Seattle and 18 percent more than in Chicago.11 
In Tokyo the cost of building a new subway line is 
approximately $448 million per mile; in Paris, it 
is roughly $368 million per mile. By comparison, 
New York’s Second Avenue subway and 7 train 
extension have each cost the MTA well over $2 
billion per mile.12
The report recommends a number of changes 
to state and city contracting laws and practices 
that could bring down construction costs.
The massive scale of infrastructure needs 
also requires a more comprehensive capital plan-
ning process. While the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) commissions the Asset In-
formation Management System report, some ex-
perts say that its assessments are often cursory 
and it excludes huge portions of the city’s assets 
such as water mains, treatment plants and sewer 
pipes. Rather than basing capital allocations on 
the needs outlined in the report, OMB has tended 
to base funding levels on a mixture of precedent, 
persuasion and debt capacity. 
 “The city needs more sophisticated and prac-
tical long-term planning,” says Stephen Berger, 
former executive director of the Emergency Con-
trol Board and an expert on capital budgeting.
There also must be more coordination be-
tween capital and maintenance spending. When 
buildings are not maintained properly on a day-
to-day basis—when the snow isn’t cleared off the 
roof and routine malfunctions are not taken care 
of in a timely fashion—properties become dis-
tressed and capital costs increase. 
Coming to terms with New York’s huge state 
of good repair needs is an immense challenge, 
but the city’s health, quality of life and econom-
ic competitiveness depends on it. “If New York 
City wants to maintain its presence in the world, 
among other leading global cities, we have no 
choice but to maintain this infrastructure,” says 
Mary Ann Tighe, New York Tri-State Region CEO 
for real estate firm CBRE. “We’re selling talent 
above all in New York. But the talent won’t come 
here without a strong infrastructure and environ-
ment.”
“It’s an issue of competitiveness and livabil-
ity,” adds Elliot Sander. “If our infrastructure is 
not advanced to an acceptable level and then 
maintained, these systems will degrade. We know 
from the 1980s that these systems will fall apart. 
It came very close to killing the city and region. 
You probably need to double the investment to 
both bring all the elements up to a state of good 
repair and to deal with the added demand from 
the growth we have had, and then put it on a reg-
ular replacement cycle. We also need to get more 
for our money. It will be difficult to do all of this 
financially and politically. But if we continue on 
the current course, it is likely New York will be 
substantially diminished as a global leader, with 
enormous environmental, social, political, and fi-
nancial implications that far outweigh the cost.”
This report is intended to prompt a serious 
discussion among community leaders and the 
general public that the infrastructure vulner-
abilities discussed here must be addressed if New 
York City is to remain a dominant global urban 
destination. While the report is a deep dive into 
the state of disrepair of the backbone infrastruc-
ture of what makes New York work, it is not a 
substitute for the study and documentation of 
the respective expertise of each of the discussed 
infrastructure systems. Our study is intended to 
shine a light on what their needs truly are.
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OVERVIEW
 ► While Super Storm Sandy focused much-needed atten-
tion on key pieces of New York City’s infrastructure, the city 
faces a number of other infrastructure vulnerabilities that 
have little to do with storm-preparedness—from aging 
water mains and deteriorating roads to crumbling public 
schools. If left unchecked, they could wreak havoc on the 
city’s economy and quality of life.
 ► New York City is one of the world’s most important global 
cities in the 21st Century, but much of its infrastructure re-
mains a relic of the early 20th Century. 
 ► To remain economically competitive and ensure the high 
quality of life New Yorkers have come to expect, New York 
City and State policymakers will have to find ways to meet 
these important infrastructure needs. 
 ► To address mounting infrastructure gaps, the city will have 
to identify new sources of funding for critical capital proj-
ects, find ways to reduce construction costs andimprove the 
planning process for infrastructure spending.
MOUNTING CAPITAL NEEDS
 ► The cost of simply repairing or replacing existing infrastruc-
ture across the five boroughs is estimated to be $47.3 bil-
lion. This figure does not include the cost of expansion proj-
ects, such as new parks or schools. It also excludes the DEP, 
whose needs are well into the tens of billions of dollars.
 ► City agencies with significant capital needs for maintaining 
the safety and functioning of existing infrastructure include 
the Department of Transportation ($3.2 billion), Depart-
ment of Education ($1.3 billion), Parks Department ($471 
million), Department of Correction ($293 million) and the 
Health and Hospitals Corp. ($282 million).
 ► State of Good Repair needs are even more significant at 
other governmental entities in the city, such as the New 
York City Transit division of the MTA ($16.3 billion), the New 
York City Housing Authority ($15.5 billion), the Port Author-
ity ($6.8 billion) and CUNY ($2.5 billion). 
 ► Based on accumulated funding gaps and shortfalls in up-
coming capital plans, the state of good repair funding gap 
will reach $34.2 billion over the next five years. 
 ► At several agencies, less than 20 percent of the document-
ed capital needs have been funded. This includes just 17 
percent at the Department of Education ($224 million of the 
$1.3 billion), 17 percent at the Parks Department ($81 mil-
lion out of $471 million) and 15 percent at the Department 
of Correction ($45 million out of $293 million). 
STREETS & HIGHWAYS 
 ► The number of city streets with a pavement rating of “good” 
fell from 84.3 percent in 2000 to 69.6 percent in 2013. 
 ► NYC DOT sets a goal of resurfacing approximately 1,000 
lane miles of streets each year, but the agency has fallen 
short of that target on all but three occasions since Fiscal 
Year 2000 (FY2009, FY2011 and FY2012). During this period, 
it resurfaced an average of only 852 lane miles per year.  
 ► City roads outlive their useful life by 20 percent on average 
before being resurfaced or reconstructed. 
 ► Less than 60 percent of streets in Manhattan (57.3 percent) 
and Staten Island (59.9 percent) received a “good” rat-
ing for pavement conditions, compared to 72.8 percent in 
Brooklyn, 70.3 percent in Queens and 66.0 percent in the 
Bronx. 
 ► Of all city neighborhoods, West Harlem/Morningside 
Heights has the worst pavement conditions, with just 34.1 
percent of streets in “good” condition. Six of the 10 neigh-
borhoods with the worst pavement conditions are in Man-
hattan.
 ► The average highway in the five boroughs does not receive 
a “good” rating. On a 10-point scale where a 9 or 10 is ex-
cellent, 7 or 8 is good, 6 is fair and 1-5 is poor, the city’s 
overall highway condition rating was just 6.58 in 2012. 
 ► Highway conditions in the city have declined, from an over-
all surface rating of 6.74 in 2008 to 6.58 in 2012. Conditions 
have deteriorated in every borough except Brooklyn. 
 ► Five of the highways with the lowest surface rating are in 
Queens: Route 25A, Route 24, the Shore Front Parkway, 
Cross Bay Parkway and Jackie Robinson Parkway.
BRIDGES
 ► The city’s 1,445 bridges are 63 years old on average, with 
165 of them built more than a century ago.
 ► The oldest bridges are in the Bronx and Manhattan, where 
the average age is 72 years.
 ► In 2012, 162 bridges across the city—or 11 percent of the 
total—were structurally deficient. 
 ► Of all the boroughs, the Bronx was home to the highest 
share of “structurally deficient” bridges in 2012, with 16 per-
cent of its bridges deemed structurally deficient. Brooklyn 
(14 percent) had the next highest share of structurally defi-
cient bridges, followed by Manhattan (13 percent), Queens 
(9 percent) and Staten Island (2 percent). 
 ► At least 47 bridges in New York City were “fracture critical” 
and “structurally deficient” in 2012. This included 16 in the 
Bronx, 14 in Manhattan and 10 in Brooklyn
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SUBWAYS
 ► New York’s subway signaling system is old and obsolete. Of 
the 728 miles of mainline signals, 269 have exceeded their 
50-year useful life—26 percent are more than 70 years old 
and 11 percent are between 50 and 69 years old.
 ► New York’s 13 subway shops and repair yards are 90 years 
old, on average. The East New York facility, originally built 
in 1880 as a horse and carriage depot, still relies completely 
on hand-thrown switches. Fifty-four percent of the compo-
nents at these repair facilities have exceeded their useful 
life. 
AIRPORTS
 ► LaGuardia’s main terminal is 50 years old and in terrible 
condition, while two of JFK’s six terminals have stood for 
over four decades. 
 ► JFK’s air cargo facilities are 40 years old on average, with 63 
percent of cargo space considered “non-viable,” or unfit 
for modern screening, storage and distribution. 
UNDERGROUND INFRASTRUCTURE 
 ► New York City’s 6,800 miles of water mains are 69 years old, 
on average. 
 ► 2,200 miles of the water mains—roughly a third of the city’s 
total—are made of unlined cast iron that was laid before 
1930. Another 2,400 miles are cement lined cast iron in-
stalled between 1930 and 1969. Both materials are inferior 
to the flexible ductile iron used today and are susceptible 
to internal corrosion and prone to leak.
 ► In 2013, there were 403 water main breaks across the city. 
This is up from 370 in 2012, but down significantly from a 
decade ago, when there were more than 500 water main 
breaks a year. 
 ► The difference between the amount of water that enters the 
city’s water delivery system and the amount consumed by 
customers is 24 percent, about double the 10 to 15 percent 
industry standard.
 ► The average age of New York City’s 6,400 miles of sewage 
mains is approximately 84 years. More than 1,100 miles are 
over 100 years old and two thirds were installed prior to 
1940.
 ► New York’s 6,300 miles of gas mains are 56 years old, on 
average. 
 ► 68 percent of the city’s steam mains and services are over 
40 years old. 
GOVERNMENT IT 
 ► Mainframes operated by the city’s Department of Infor-
mation Technology and Telecommunications currently run 
approximately 170 applications on DB2 and ADABAS, da-
tabase management systems released in 1983 and 1970, 
respectively. 
SCHOOLS
 ► 209 of the city’s 1,177 school buildings were built prior to 
1920. 
 ► The average school building in the five boroughs was con-
structed in 1948. Of the 1,200 school buildings in the DOE 
portfolio, 170 are more than a century old and 370 predate 
the Great Depression.
 ► Brooklyn’s schools are the oldest in the city. The average 
age is over 70 years old and 77 of them have been standing 
for more than a century. 
PUBLIC HOUSING
 ► More than 75 percent of NYCHA’s residential buildings are 
over 40 years old and 531 have been around since at least 
1950. 
 ► Of NYCHA’s 2,600 buildings, 1,500 do not comply with Lo-
cal Law 11 standards for exterior and façade conditions. 
 ► A Physical Needs Assessment commissioned by NYCHA 
in 2011 found that façade repairs would require $621 mil-
lion immediately and $6.7 billion over the next five years, 
far greater than the $580 million allotted. This is in addition 
to the $7.6 billion needed to rehabilitate apartments, $1.2 
billion for mechanical systems, $893 million for building 
grounds and $217 million for electrical equipment
OTHER PUBLIC BUILDINGS
 ► The 55 shelters operated by the Department of Homeless 
Services are more than 70 years old, on average.  
 ► Sixty-one percent of city-owned courthouses were erected 
before 1940.  
 ► The average city hospital is 57 years old. 
 ► The average building on CUNY’s 24 campuses is 53 years 
old, and 69 of them were constructed more than 75 years 
ago.
 ► Half of the clinics operated by the city’s Department of 
Health and Mental Hygiene were built prior to 1950.
 ► The average complex on Rikers Island is 44 years old, while 
the city’s borough detention centers are 47 years old on av-
erage.
 ► Seven of the 25 oldest and six of the most visited parks in 
the nation are in New York City
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INCREASING INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENTS
 ► Make investing in NYC’s aging infrastructure a key 
part of the de Blasio administration’s plans to cre-
ate middle-income jobs
 ► Refocus capital spending on state of good repair 
needs
 ► Identify new dedicated revenue sources to pay for 
infrastructure projects—and stop diverting money 
from existing “dedicated” funding streams
 ► Implement East River tolls or congestion fees 
 ► Introduce a Surface Water Management Fee to in-
centivize capture of rainwater before it enters sew-
ers
 ► Create new mechanisms to capture value from in-
frastructure projects
 ► More federal support
 ► A lift from Albany
 ► Stop diverting airport revenue
 ► Create an infrastructure bank to help select and 
finance projects with high strategic and economic 
potential
BRINGING DOWN INFRASTRUCTURE COSTS
 ► Authorize Design-Build and public-private partner-
ships
 ► Avoid “Low Bids” from unqualified contractors
 ► Reduce the time to design and approve construc-
tion contracts
 ► Renew Project Labor Agreements
 ► Repeal the Scaffold Law
IMPROVING INFRASTRUCTURE PLANNING
 ► Create a more effective capital planning process
 ► Establish a more accurate and thorough survey 
of the city’s infrastructure assets and their state of 
good repair
 ► Better align infrastructure investments with eco-
nomic development goals
 ► Take a census of underground utilities
DEVELOPING INFRASTRUCTURE INNOVATIONS
 ► Expand the MTA’s Small Business Mentoring Pro-
gram
 ► Invest in real-time bridge sensor technologies
 ► Lease space on city street lights, traffic signals and 
pay phones for telecom company cell sites 
 ► Reassign agency tech engineers to DoITT
RECOMMENDATIONS CAUTION AHEAD // CENTER FOR AN URBAN FUTURE
The following is a summary of the report’s recommendations.
A far more detailed recommendations section begins on page 56.
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More than anything else, New York City’s trans-
portation infrastructure—its roads, highways, 
bridges and subways—ties a collection of pen-
insulas and islands into a single city. Its airports 
serve as important gateways to the world at a time 
of increasing global economic interdependence. 
But unlike many of its counterparts in the global 
economy, New York’s core transportation infra-
structure is old and outdated.
Even as officials look to buses and bikes to 
create a multimodal transit network, city roads 
outlive their useful life by 20 percent on aver-
age before being resurfaced or reconstructed. The 
city’s 1,445 bridges are 63 years old on average, 
with 162 of them deemed structurally deficient 
and 47 falling into an even more dangerous cat-
egory of being fracture critical and structurally 
deficient. Meanwhile, even as subway ridership 
has increased dramatically over the last decade 
(weekend ridership is at an all-time high), an an-
tiquated signaling system and inadequate subway 
stations inhibit capacity and contribute to delays. 
Major terminals at LaGuardia and, to a lesser ex-
tent, JFK airports are in poor condition and strug-
gle to accommodate dramatically increased pas-
senger traffic.
Streets
New York City’s streets do far more than car-
ry automobile traffic. Roads help buses, bicycles 
and pedestrians navigate the city, provide a pro-
tective layer over fragile utility mains and guide 
rainwater to catch basins. Yet, in recent years, city 
streets have been deteriorating. Indeed, the num-
ber of city streets with a pavement rating of “good” 
fell from 84.3 percent in 2000 to 69.6 percent in 
2013.13
The city’s Department of Transportation is 
charged with maintaining streets throughout the 
five boroughs, but in recent years it has struggled 
to keep up. With a useful life of 17 to 18 years,14 
approximately 1,000 lane miles out of the total 
18,24215 fall out of good repair every year. But 
while the DOT sets a goal of resurfacing 1,000 
lane miles each year, the agency has fallen short 
of that target on all but three occasions since 
Fiscal Year 2000 (FY2009, FY2011 and FY2012). 
During this period, it resurfaced an average of 
only 852 lane miles per year.  
“In the early 2000s, the street budget was an 
easy thing to cut and we ended up resurfacing a 
lot fewer streets for many years,” says Eric Bea-
ton, New York City Department of Transportation 
(DOT) director of Transit Development. “That’s a 
deficit we’re still trying to dig out of, and it will 
last for many more years.” The city would need to 
resurface 3,067 miles this year to make up for the 
accumulated deficit from 2000 to 2013. Not only 
MOBILITY
Whether New Yorkers travel by car, subway or plane, they confront aging and decaying systems 
that limit mobility and undermine the city’s economy
NYC Streets: Lane Miles
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Source: Mayor’s Management Report, 2007-2014
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Source: Mayor’s Management Report, 2001-2014
Road Conditions by Borough
Borough % of Street Lanes in "Poor" or "Fair" Condition
Manhattan 42.7%
Staten Island 40.1%
Bronx 34.0%
Queens 29.7%
Brooklyn 27.2%
Source:  Mayor’s Management Report, 2013
The Resurfacing Gap
NYC DOT sets a goal of resurfacing 1,000 lane miles a year that fall
into disrepair, but it has only met that target three times since 2000.
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30.4%
of NYC roads in “fair” or “poor”
condition, up from 15.7% in 2000
Worst Street Conditions in NYC,
By Community Board
Community Board % of Street Lanes in "Poor" or "Fair" Condition
Manhattan 9 65.9%
Manhattan 11 53.0%
Manhattan 1 48.8%
Manhattan 3 46.4%
Manhattan 8 43.4%
Staten Island 2 43.4%
Brooklyn 13 43.2%
Bronx 10 42.6%
Manhattan 6 42.0%
Queens 2 40.7%
Source: Mayor’s Management Report, 2013
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would this overwhelm DOT’s resources, the fre-
quency of street closures would strangle the cir-
culation of traffic. 
Simply resurfacing the street, however, is of-
ten inadequate. New York’s well-trafficked roads 
are subject to significant wear and tear. Deterio-
ration can reach below the road surface and affect 
the base structure. When this foundation is dam-
aged, new asphalt will not last as long as it would 
otherwise, necessitating more frequent paving. 
And while a solid base will absorb the vibrations 
of street traffic, a damaged foundation leaves the 
utility mains it houses   susceptible to the thump-
ing of large vehicles. 
To repair the foundation requires replacing 
the roadway down to a foot or more below the 
street’s surface and usually includes reconstruc-
tion of the curbs and sidewalks as well.16 Yet 
street reconstructions, fundamental to the long-
term health of city streets, have steadily declined 
in recent years. From 2006 to 2007, DOT recon-
structed 136 lane miles. In the last two years, only 
80 miles were reconstructed.17
While streets are in disrepair throughout New 
York, the problem is worse in certain boroughs 
and neighborhoods. Every year, in preparation 
for the Mayor’s Management Report, street condi-
tions are assessed, and individual blocks receive 
a rating of good, fair or poor based on the qual-
ity of the pavement. While 73 percent of Brooklyn 
streets received the highest rating of “good” in FY 
2012, in Manhattan and Staten Island less than 60 
percent of the streets were “good.”18
Ratings at the community board level provide 
further evidence of these disparities. Of the 10 
community board districts with the worst pave-
ment conditions, six are in Manhattan. A stag-
gering 65.9 percent of streets in West Harlem/
Morningside Heights (Community Board 9) are in 
fair to poor condition. This is considerably higher 
than the community district with the next worst 
rating: Manhattan Community Board 11, where 53 
percent of streets are in fair to poor condition.19
Highways 
Highways are critical to the functioning of 
the city. Thousands of tons of air cargo arriving at 
JFK are distributed via the Van Wyck Expressway 
every year. Millions of pounds of fish, produce 
and meat are delivered to Hunts Point and then 
to grocery stores across the five boroughs via the 
Bruckner Expressway. Visitors from Long Island, 
New Jersey and New England use the city’s inter-
states, parkways and expressways to visit its mu-
seums and theaters, shop in the city’s stores and 
cheer in its sporting arenas.  
While the city DOT is responsible for the lo-
cal streets, highways fall under the purview of the 
state. Though supervision is different, the results 
are the same: deteriorating conditions and a num-
ber of highways in disrepair.  
Each year, the state DOT inspects New York 
City’s 306 miles of highway and rates pavement 
conditions on a 10-point scale, where 6 is consid-
ered “fair” with “surface distress clearly visible” 
and 5 is considered “poor” where “distress is fre-
quent and severe.” Overall, highway maintenance 
has declined in the city, with 51 percent rated 
“fair” or “poor” in 2012  compared to 38 percent in 
2008. Conditions have declined in every borough 
except Brooklyn. Bronx’s highways experienced 
the greatest deterioration, with highway surfac-
es rated “fair” or “poor” jumping from 18 percent 
in 2008 to 44 percent in 2012. It was followed by 
Manhattan (28 percent to 48 percent), Queens (38 
percent to 52 percent) and Staten Island (51 per-
cent to 60 percent). 
Perhaps the most glaring problem in the city’s 
highway network is the Gowanus Expressway. 
Completed in 1941, the crumbling elevated ex-
pressway is functionally obsolete. “The Gowanus 
[Expressway] is one roadway that forever has 
needed to be replaced,” says Christopher Mc-
Bride, community transportation specialist with 
AAA New York. “It is just being patched together. 
… The operations are totally inadequate for the 
traffic it carries. It was designed for a different 
era with different traffic volumes and patterns.”
According to McBride, the Gowanus is not the 
only city highway that has severely deteriorated. 
“FDR Drive is really in terrible shape. There are 
sections of it that need to be rebuilt. It is beyond 
potholes--it looks like you should have a tank to 
go over it,” says McBride. “The Cross Bronx Ex-
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Source: NYS Dept. of Transportation, “Pavement Data Report Region 11,” 2012. Based on a 10-point scale, where 1-5 is considered “poor,” 6 is “fair,” 7-8 is 
“good” and 9-10 “excellent.”
Highway Lanes Rated “Fair” or “Poor,” by Borough
2008 2012
60%
55%
52%51%
48%
44%
51%
74%
38%38%
28%
19%
Staten IslandBrooklynQueensNew York CityManhattanBronx
NYC Highways With the Lowest Surface Rating
Route Borough Mileage Surface Rating
Route 25A Queens 12.42 6.0
Korean War Veterans Parkway Staten Island 4.63 6.0
Moshulu Parkway Bronx 3.11 6.0
Pelham Parkway Bronx 2.28 6.0
Route 24 Queens 1.92 6.0
Shore Front Parkway Queens 1.58 6.0
Cross Bay Parkway Queens 0.33 6.0
Jackie Robinson Parkway Queens 4.9 5.8
Route 22 Bronx 0.36 5.0
Source: NYS Dept. of Transportation, “Pavement Data Report Region 11,” 2012. Based on a 10-point scale, where 1-5 is considered “poor,” 6 is “fair,” 7-8 is 
“good” and 9-10 “excellent.”
Center for an Urban Future Caution Ahead15
pressway is totally overloaded. You have sub-
standard shoulders, on and off ramps that are too 
short. It is a nightmare.”
While several factors—including inclement 
weather, increased traffic volume and heavier 
vehicles—can affect highway conditions, reduced 
funding is paramount. In recent years, the New 
York State DOT has shifted its priorities from 
highways to bridges, according to Rick Bennett, 
the agency’s statewide pavement manager. “Be-
cause the bridge needs are greater than the pave-
ment needs,” he says, “bridges are getting a larger 
share of the funding—especially in the city.”
According to Bennett, the state DOT follows a 
systematic pavement strategy. Once the pavement 
rating falls to a six, the road will be resurfaced. 
Using this as a guideline, a number of New York’s 
highways are clearly overdue for repair. Five of 
the worst maintained highways are in Queens: 
Route 25A, Route 24, the Shore Front Parkway, 
Cross Bay Parkway and the Jackie Robinson Park-
way. 
Bridges
New York’s 1,445 bridges stitch the city togeth-
er, carrying vehicles, bicycles and pedestrians not 
only over waterways, but train tracks, neighbor-
hoods, highways and roads. Ownership and over-
sight of these bridges is divided among the state 
DOT, city DOT, Port Authority, MTA and a number 
of other agencies and authorities. But there is one 
common thread: A significant percentage of them 
are extremely old and many are in poor condition. 
Forty-one percent of the city’s bridges were 
built prior to 1950. One hundred and sixty-five 
have stood for over a century. The oldest are in 
the Bronx and Manhattan, where the average 
age is 72 years. Not surprisingly, bridges in these 
two boroughs are also in the worst state of repair. 
“Within our transportation network, the worst 
state of good repair is our bridges,” says Jack 
Schmidt, director of transportation planning at 
the New York City Department of City Planning.
According to the Federal Highway Adminis-
tration, a bridge is “structurally deficient if sig-
nificant load-carrying elements are found to be 
in poor condition due to deterioration or damage.” 
In 2012, 162 of the city’s 1,445 bridges—or 11 per-
cent—were structurally deficient. Of all the bor-
oughs, the Bronx was home to the highest share 
of structurally deficient bridges, with 52 in all 
representing 16 percent of its total. Fourteen per-
cent of Brooklyn’s bridges were structurally defi-
cient as were 13 percent in Manhattan, 9 percent 
in Queens and 2 percent in Staten Island. 
New York City DOT, which must often coordi-
nate with state highway and envi-
ronmental agencies located in Al-
bany, has the highest percentage of 
structurally deficient bridges. 
Inspections performed by the 
New York State DOT employ a 
more rigorous assessment than 
the federal government. Inspec-
tors evaluate the condition of up to 
47 structural elements to reach a 
comprehensive score ranging from 
1 to 7. A rating below 5 is consid-
ered “deficient,” indicating the 
bridge requires corrective mainte-
nance or rehabilitation to be fully 
functional. In 2012, the average 
bridge in New York City had a con-
dition rating of 4.98. Of the city’s 
1,445 bridges, 852 were deficient 
New York City Bridge Ratings, 2012
Average 
Year Built
Average
Condition 
Rating
# Structurally 
Deficient
% Structurally 
Deficient
Bronx 1942 4.8 52 16%
Brooklyn 1947 5.1 33 14%
Manhattan 1942 4.7 31 13%
Queens 1960 5.1 43 9%
Staten Island 1963 5.2 3 2%
Total 1951 5.0 162 11%
Source: NYS Dept. of Transportation, “New York State Highway Bridge Data 2014”
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according to state standards and in need of reha-
bilitation. Manhattan’s bridges scored a lowly 4.66 
on average followed by the Bronx (4.81), Brook-
lyn (5.08), Queens (5.12) and Staten Island (5.22). 
Even the city’s most prominent bridges ur-
gently need repair. Suspender ropes on the 
George Washington Bridge, the world’s busiest 
motor vehicle bridge, are original equipment dat-
ing back to 1931. The average age of replacement 
for suspender ropes is 70 years, making these a 
dozen years overdue. According to inspections 
by the Port Authority, which manages the bridge, 
many of the ropes show evidence of corrosion and 
reduced strength.20 According to the Port Author-
ity’s latest ten-year capital plan, released in early 
2014, all the ropes will not be replaced until the 
end of 2024.21
Structural issues also plague several bridg-
es along highways, particularly the Brooklyn-
Queens Expressway. The city’s longest bridge, an 
elevated section of the BQE, carries cars over the 
Gowanus Canal and the Red Hook neighborhood. 
According to one prominent engineer, “patch 
work is being done but there are no plans for a 
complete rehabilitation which is sorely needed.” 
Similarly, along the “triple-cantilevered” section 
of the BQE below the Brooklyn Heights Prome-
nade, the “steel within the structure has not been 
inspected in 60 years.”  Loss of any section of the 
BQE would result in incalculable costs, diverting 
trucks to city streets and likely adding casualties. 
While the city and state manage dozens of old 
bridges across the five boroughs, newer bridges 
also pose problems. In the 1950s and 1960s, the 
introduction of the computer allowed engineers 
to make more precise calculations and so forego 
the duplication of parts. It turns out, however, 
that so-called “unnecessary duplication” becomes 
extremely important as bridges age. As a result, 
while most older bridges hover around 4, the 
safety factor on most of these newer bridges is 
2. If you add corrosion, the bridge can degrade 
and become a “fracture critical bridge.” If these 
bridges then lose just one connection, one joint, 
one span, one beam, explains Sam Schwartz, CEO 
of Samuel Schwartz Engineering, the bridge falls 
down.
At least 47 bridges in New York City were both 
fracture critical and structurally deficient in 2012. 
This includes 16 in the Bronx, 14 in Manhattan 
and 10 in Brooklyn. The daily traffic volume on 
these 47 bridges is 2.7 million cars; eight carry 
more than 120,000 cars per day.
Subway Signals
The MTA’s signaling system is old and ob-
solete. Of the 728 miles of mainline signals, 269 
have exceeded their 50-year useful life. Twenty-
six percent are more than 70 years old and 11 
percent are between 50 and 69 years old.26 The 
equipment is no longer manufactured, forcing the 
Transit Authority to build and replace parts at its 
own signal shop.27
Bridge Condition, by Owner
Owner Average Year Built
# Structurally 
Deficient
% Structurally 
Deficient
NYCDOT 1934 85 14.2%
NYSDOT 1965 64 10.5%
MTA 1952 11 10.1%
PA 1965 2 1.8%
Source: NYS Dept. of Transportation, “New York State Highway Bridge Data 2014”
47
bridges in New York City were
both fracture critical and structurally 
deficient in 2012
2.7 mil
cars drive every day on the 47 New 
York City bridges that were both fracture 
critical and structurally deficient 
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The existing signal system is partitioned into 
fixed blocks, permitting only one train to be in 
any block at a time. If a train attempts to enter 
an occupied block, an automatic brake is applied. 
While this system ensures safety, it is imprecise 
and inefficient. In modern “moving block” sys-
tems, sensors record the precise location of every 
subway car. Computers at a rail control center cal-
culate and enforce “safe zones” around each train 
according to its speed and location. This system, 
known as Communications Based Train Con-
trol (CBTC), increases track capacity by allowing 
trains to run closer together and faster without 
compromising safety. When CBTC was installed 
on the L line in 2006, the MTA increased its hour-
ly throughput from 15 to 26 trains.28
Despite the obvious efficiency and safety im-
provement that accompany CBTC, rollout will 
be slow. At this time, only the L line has had a 
complete overhaul. Current investment along the 
7 line will be a “hybrid upgrade”,29 melding stan-
dard and advanced signaling technology. By the 
end of 2034, approximately half of the system still 
will use outdated fixed block signals.30
The Queens Boulevard and Sixth Avenue cor-
ridor upgrades, for instance, are part of a broad-
er strategy to modernize signal interlockings—
where tracks cross or merge—without addressing 
the remainder of the corridor or installing CBTC 
until years later. Wynton Habersham, vice presi-
dent of Maintenance of Way at the MTA, says this 
approach is not a full modernization and will pro-
vide only “very bottom-level capabilities, no auto-
matic train scheduling or train routing and the re-
lated efficiencies until CBTC is introduced a few 
years down the line.”
Several factors explain the slow and limited 
approach to modernization. Foremost is the ex-
pense. From 2015-2034, the MTA will spend near-
MODERNIZING NEW YORK’S SUBWAY SYSTEM
Just a few decades ago, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) was on the brink. 
Antiquated subway cars screeched along, while train car malfunctions and track fires plagued the 
system.22 In 1982, a breakdown occurred every 7,145 miles. Today, conditions are dramatically improved, 
with a breakdown every 162,138 miles, an astounding 2,169 percent improvement.23
Yet for all its progress, few would confuse the New York City subway with Hong Kong, Seoul or 
Tokyo’s sleek, technologically advanced systems. Stations feature broken tiles, leaking roofs, flaking 
paint and rusted beams. Nearly 300 stations lack countdown clocks that provide real-time arrival 
information.24 And a quarter of the signaling equipment, governing the movement of trains, dates back 
to the 1930s.25 Robert “Buzz” Paaswell, director emeritus of the University Transportation Research 
Center at City College, confirms that New York’s subways are not world-class in the 21st century. “It’s a 
1980 or 1990 world-class system,” he says. 
After decades of rehabilitating and replacing decaying infrastructure, the MTA capital strategy is 
now pivoting toward modernization. In the 2000-2009 capital budgets, 29 percent of spending went to 
replace cars and track, while only 15 percent was directed to modernizing signals and communications. 
Today, with both cars and track in a state of good repair, the funding hierarchy has reversed.  In the 
2010-2014 five-year capital plan, signals and communications received 29 percent, while track and 
railcars got 20 percent of the total budget.
Modernizing the city’s public transit will not be easy. Digitizing such a colossal system demands 
ingenuity, coordination and significant manpower. With subways running 24 hours a day, accessing the 
track for repairs and replacements always disrupts travel. A slow rollout is inevitable, raising fears that 
the new technologies will be obsolete by the time they’re finally implemented. 
37%
of subways signals have exceeded
their 50-year useful life
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ly $16 billion on signal upgrades, a historic sum.31 
Expediting signal modernization would require 
a tremendous infusion of money or a significant 
redistribution of capital dollars among MTA sub-
sidiaries. Even with unlimited funds, replacing 
signals would be exceedingly difficult and disrup-
tive. The 7 and L trains operate on isolated lines, 
rarely crossing or merging with other corridors. 
Consequently, weekend and nighttime closures of 
those lines has had only a minimal impact on the 
system as a whole. For lines serving major Man-
hattan corridors, on the other hand, track access 
must be timed methodically and gradually to min-
imize disruption. 
In addition to funding and track access is-
sues, the MTA is hobbled by a dearth of quali-
fied contractors. At the moment, only three to four 
contractors are available to perform signal instal-
lation and modernization work. This limits com-
petition, increases expenses and caps the amount 
of signal work that can be performed at any one 
time. To address this constraint, the MTA recently 
began a mentoring program for training contrac-
tors. 
Signal upgrades and the deployment of CBTC 
will affect every aspect of the subway system. The 
MTA must purchase new cars capable of commu-
nication with the rail control center. Modern trains 
and higher throughput will increase electricity 
loads, straining an aging distribution network; 38 
percent of the New York City Transit power sys-
tem is in a poor state of repair with substation 
buildings in urgent need of investment. Finally, a 
larger stock of subway cars will necessitate great-
er capacity at rail yards and shops. 
Subway Stations
The subway station is every rider’s first point 
of contact; the initial indication of the safety, com-
fort, accessibility and efficiency of the entire sys-
tem. In New York, this first impression is rarely a 
good one.
New York’s subway stations are chaotic and 
beleaguered. Trash is sometimes strewn across 
the platform and between the tracks. Leaking 
ceilings and water-damaged walls are pervasive. 
Paint peels from the ceiling. Columns rust. Bot-
tlenecks form at narrow stairwells, choking the 
circulation of foot traffic. “New York’s subway sta-
tions are terrible,” says Paaswell of the University 
Transportation Research Center. “They’re dirty. 
They’re dingy. They need painting. They need 
new architecture. They need better lighting.”
These issues go beyond cosmetics or mere in-
conveniences. Discarded newspapers along the 
third rail ignite track fires.32 Garbage caught in 
the drains causes flooding.33 Leaking roofs dam-
age station equipment, particularly electronics.34
NYC’s Most Congested Subway Station Entryways, Riders per Entrance
Station Borough Line Ridership Entrances Riders per Entrance
Parkchester Bronx 6  4,687,402 1  4,687,402 
Canarsie-Rockaway Pkwy Brooklyn L  3,920,243 1  3,920,243 
8 Av Brooklyn N  3,559,576 1  3,559,576 
72 St Manhattan 1-2-3  13,043,031 4  3,260,758 
Newkirk Plaza Brooklyn B-Q  3,021,079 1  3,021,079 
System  1,654,582,265 1,861  889,082 
Sources: MTA, “Annual Subway Ridership,” 2012; NYC Open Data, “Subway Entrances,” 2013
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While MTA officials recognize these deficien-
cies, in recent years they have scaled down their 
approach to rehabilitation. “In stations, the MTA 
has basically conceded that you will never get to 
a state of good repair,” says Jeremy Soffin, the for-
mer MTA spokesperson. “It’s simply not possible. 
There are so many tens of billions of dollars of 
repair needs.” Since 2010, the MTA has opted to 
replace individual components in stations rather 
than perform comprehensive renovations. Ac-
cording to officials, the old strategy proved too 
slow and too costly.35
The new approach has its critics. While MTA 
considers component replacement a cost-saving 
measure, that may not be the case in the long run. 
“Say you’re replacing 10 stairs in several stations,” 
explains Elizabeth Keating, Executive Deputy In-
spector General at the Office of the MTA Inspec-
tor General. “When you begin installation, you 
find that the beam you’re attaching it to is par-
tially rotted and will likely need to be replaced in 
three or four years. It may be cheaper to replace 
the beams when you replace the stairs, but you 
haven’t been authorized to do so, and resources 
are scarce. These are the kind of trade-offs that 
capital program managers face. The component 
program is a smart strategy when there’s very 
little money, but it may eventually end up being 
more costly.”
Other concerns are aesthetic. Without a com-
plete overhaul, stations may be functional, but 
will continue to look dingy. This can discourage 
ridership and encourage bad behavior. 
Moreover, as ridership has grown over the 
last decade, crowding has become prevalent, with 
some subway stations more equipped to handle 
the congestion than others.36 The subway’s 468 
stations feature 1,861 entrances, with an average 
of 889,082 riders circulating through each one an-
nually. Certain entryways are more heavily traf-
ficked than others. The Parkchester station, for 
example, has only one entry point for 4.7 million 
annual riders—the worst bottleneck in the sub-
way system. It is followed by the Canarsie-Rock-
away Parkway, 8th Avenue (Sunset Park), 72nd St 
(Upper West Side) and Newkirk Plaza (Flatbush) 
stations. 
After navigating the entryway, problems con-
tinue at the platform. MTA Chairman Thomas 
Prendergast has described a “number of loca-
tions” where platforms frequently become so 
crowded that it is “hard for the next train to dis-
charge its passengers and get off.”37 To improve 
circulation in the coming years, the MTA will de-
vote $900,000 to relocate turnstiles and introduce 
visual cues to more efficiently funnel traffic.38 
While this experimentation is certainly welcome, 
more fundamental engineering will also be nec-
essary, including additional entryways, escalators, 
elevators and wider stairways.
Subway Shops and Yards
The MTA’s 6,311 subway cars traveled 365 
million miles last year, a long haul for some old 
machinery.39 Subway cars are generally in good 
repair, and no railcar on the numbered lines is 
more than 30 years old. Some relics, though, re-
main on the tracks. These include 226 R-32 sub-
way cars (originally built in 1964), 50 R-52 cars 
(1969) and 750 R-46 cars (1975). These antiquat-
ed railcars are used exclusively on the lettered 
lines, predominantly the A, C and E.40
To keep these aging subway cars running re-
quires regular maintenance. At the MTA’s shops 
and yards, an endless stream of trains are stored, 
inspected and repaired. Workers repaint seats, 
“In stations, the MTA has 
basically conceded that you 
will never get to a state of 
good repair ... It’s simply 
not possible. There are so 
many tens of billions of 
dollars of repair needs.”
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wash windows, fix air condition motors, replace 
brakes and grind and refinish wheels. 
Like the system they service, subway shops 
and yards are old. The 13 facilities opened near-
ly 90 years ago on average. Two buildings at the 
Concourse Yard were recently placed on the Na-
tional Register of Historic Places. The East New 
York facility, originally built in 1880 as a horse and 
carriage depot, still relies completely on hand-
thrown switches. The narrow aisles at the Livonia 
and 240th Street facilities are ill configured for 
modern maintenance and repair practices.41
In a recent survey of each of its capital asset 
categories, the MTA found its yards and shops 
were in the worst state of repair. Fifty-four per-
cent of the components at these facilities exceed 
their useful life. Thirty-eight percent of lighting is 
in poor condition and does not meet current stan-
dards.42
The MTA has not increased investment to 
address the decay at its critical maintenance fa-
cilities. Instead, capital outlays have fallen from 
$455 million in the 2000-2004 capital budget to 
$263 million43 in the current five-year budget.  If 
greater attention is not paid to rehabbing these 
facilities, subway car maintenance will suffer and 
train delays will become more common.
Airports
More than just important economic engines, 
JFK and LaGuardia airports are New York’s vital 
gateways to the global economy. They welcome 
tens of millions of tourists every year and serve 
as jumping off points for international commerce. 
Yet, despite significant public and private invest-
ment, they are among the least modern airports 
in any major global city, and are plagued by an 
array of infrastructure challenges and present a 
less-than-optimal first image of New York. 
LaGuardia’s main terminal is 50 years old and 
in terrible condition, while two of JFK’s six ter-
minals have stood for over four decades and can 
barely keep up with the increased passenger traf-
fic and larger airplanes. Meanwhile, the cargo fa-
cilities at JFK are 40 years old on average, with 63 
percent of cargo space considered “non-viable,” or 
unfit for modern screening, storage and distribu-
tion.44
“For a world-class city,” says former Deputy 
Mayor Stanley Grayson, “there is very little about 
our airports that makes us proud.”
By almost any measure, LaGuardia’s main ter-
minal, dedicated in 1964, is woefully inadequate: 
The mechanical systems are aging, the roof leaks, 
and the building is not nearly big enough to han-
dle today’s larger airplanes. “It’s a crap airport,” 
says Chris Ward, the former Port Authority execu-
tive director. 
The terminal’s tightly packed gates cause con-
gestion on the aprons, where planes park, refuel 
and board. This congestion restricts efficiency 
and produces frequent delays. With 28 percent of 
its arrivals delayed, LaGuardia ranks a lowly 48th 
among the country’s top 50 airports. It performs 
slightly better on departures, with 22 percent de-
layed and a ranking of 38th.45
The Port Authority has plans to knock down 
and replace the central terminal, and solicited 
proposals from private contractors in early 2012. 
But it did not name the finalists until July 2013,46 
and completion is not expected before 2021. Until 
Age and Condition of
JFK Cargo Facilities
Status # ofBuildings
Average 
Year
Constructed
Square
Feet
Total 33 1973   6,128,879
Viable 13 1994   2,258,433
Nonviable 20 1961   3,870,446
Source: NYC Economic Development Corporation & the Port Authority, “JFK Air 
Cargo Study,” January 2013
63%
of JFK’s air cargo facilities are unfit for 
modern screening, storage, distribution
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then, the Port Authority must keep the old termi-
nal on life support. “It’s like continually perform-
ing open heart surgery”, says Guy Zummo, senior 
consulting engineer at LaGuardia.
Conditions at JFK have improved over the 
past 10 to 15 years, thanks to the construction of 
new terminals for Delta, Jet Blue and American as 
well as an International Arrivals building. But the 
airport, which opened in 1948, has its own infra-
structure challenges. Like LaGuardia, its gates are 
not sufficiently spaced for today’s larger planes, 
which inhibits the flow of passengers exiting and 
boarding the aircraft and constrains the maneu-
vering of planes on the apron. Partly as a result, 
30 percent of arrivals and 23 percent of depar-
tures at JFK are delayed, a performance that rates 
even worse than LaGuardia’s.27
Both JFK and LaGuardia lack modern ameni-
ties in the older terminals, where food concessions 
and retail areas, both major revenue generators, 
do not meet the needs of growing passenger traf-
fic. The same is true of bathrooms. LaGuardia’s 
central terminal was designed to accommodate 8 
million annual passengers. In 2012, 25.7 million 
passed through the airport, with a little more than 
half using the central terminal.48
In a recent report, the Global Gateway Alli-
ance, an advocacy group dedicated to addressing 
the problems at New York area airports, ranked 
the 20 largest American airports according to 
their amenities for passengers. This included free 
WiFi, cell phone reception and transit access.49 
Not surprisingly, LaGuardia finished last (though 
JFK was a more respectable eighth).50 At both air-
ports, mobile phone reception is spottier than at 
other airports.51 Only Los Angeles International 
Airport has slower upload and download speeds 
than JFK and LaGuardia.
JFK’s air cargo facilities are also in need of 
major rehab. With an average age of 40 years, 
many JFK cargo buildings are simply unsuitable 
for modern distribution. While the airport tech-
nically has over 6 million square feet of storage 
space, 63 percent is considered “nonviable.”52
With today’s automated sorting and storage of 
cargo, containers and pallets can be stacked sev-
eral layers high, but most facilities at JFK have 
only a 14-to18 foot clearance, sacrificing millions 
of cubic feet of capacity and failing to provide 
room for high-tech screening and sorting machin-
ery. These buildings are also not deep enough to 
accommodate the maneuvering of 53-foot tractor-
trailers.
“The facilities are aging and functionally ob-
solete,” says David Hopkins, director of aviation at 
the New York City Economic Development Corp. 
“A lot is mothballed and needs to be torn down.”
JFK’s air cargo sector has also been hurt by 
inadequate capacity on the Van Wyck Express-
way, the only highway trucks delivering freight to 
and from the airport can use. Years of almost con-
stant congestion on the Van Wyck, along with the 
outmoded cargo facilities, have prompted several 
companies to switch their freight operations from 
JFK to other airports. From 2000 to 2013, cargo at 
JFK fell by 545,737 tons, the equivalent of 19,101 
jobs lost.53 In 2000, JFK was the third largest air 
cargo destination in the country. By 2010, it had 
fallen to seventh.54
Until the LaGuardia central terminal is knocked
down and replaced, the Port Authority must keep it
on life support. “It’s like continually performing open 
heart surgery.”
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Water mains, electric feeders, fiber cables and 
sewage pipes are primarily underground and out 
of sight. If not for their monthly bills, residents 
would give little thought to the many companies 
and government agencies operating New York’s 
vast utility infrastructure. 
The New York City Department of Environ-
mental Protection (DEP) maintains the city’s wa-
ter and sewage systems. Con Edison is responsi-
ble for electric distribution and steam as well as 
gas lines in the Bronx, Manhattan and sections of 
Queens. National Grid oversees the remaining gas 
infrastructure in Queens, Brooklyn and Staten Is-
land. Each entity operates an old and expansive 
distribution network. Sixty-eight percent of the 
city’s steam mains and services are over 40 years 
old. Over half of its gas mains were installed be-
fore 1960 and are made of unprotected cast iron, 
a corrosion prone material. As for water mains, 
2,168 miles are unlined cast iron laid before 1930. 
A staggering two-thirds of the city’s sewer pipes 
were built prior to 1940. 
Overlapping federal and state regulations can 
complicate the upkeep and repair of these anti-
quated utility systems. From 2000 to 2010, $13 bil-
lion of DEP’s $19 billion capital budget was devot-
ed to meeting federal requirements.55 While these 
drinking water and sewage regulations protect 
public health they have forced the city to take on 
massive projects like the Croton Watershed filtra-
tion plant and the Catskill-Delaware Watershed 
ultraviolet disinfection facility. This construction 
has put a severe burden on DEP’s budget and 
manpower and increased its debt obligations from 
$11.2 billion to $29.3 billion between FY 2002 and 
FY 2010.56
Natural Gas 
Natural gas accounts for approximately 65 
percent of New York City’s heating needs and fu-
els 98 percent of in-city electricity generation.57 
Demand is set to grow significantly in the coming 
decades, in large part due to significantly cheaper 
prices for natural gas and the recent citywide ban 
#4 and #6 home heating oil. To accommodate the 
growing demand across the five boroughs, New 
York’s aging gas distribution system will need to 
be upgraded and expanded. 
Con Edison and National Grid each manage 
one of the oldest gas distribution networks in the 
country. Con Edison’s 2,234 miles of gas mains 
serve 833,000 customers in the Bronx, Manhattan 
and northern Queens. Their mains are 53 years 
old on average and 60 percent are composed of 
unprotected steel or cast iron, the most leak-
prone material. According to the federal Pipeline 
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 
Con Edison experienced 83 leaks for every 100 
miles of main in 2012. Corrosion was responsible 
for a total of 427 of these leaks.
UTILITIES
Faced with aging pipes, outmoded technology and overburdened lines, utilities and government 
struggle to provide residents and businesses with the services expected in a 21st-century city
Average Age of NYC’s
Utilities Infrastructure
Miles Age
Gas Mains 6,362 56
Sewage Mains 6,437 84
Water Mains 6,785 69
Overhead Electric Cable 18,245 -
Underground Electric Cable 86,977 -
Steam Pipes 105 60
Source: NYC Municipal Water Finance Authority, “Water & Sewer System Revenue 
Bonds, Fiscal 2001 Series A” for water and sewage data. All other data provided 
during interviews.
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National Grid serves approximately 1.2 mil-
lion customers in Staten Island, Brooklyn and 
southern Queens via 4,128 miles of gas main. The 
average main is 57 years old, and 48 percent is 
made of unprotected steel or cast iron. National 
Grid experienced 45 leaks per 100 main miles in 
2012 and 68 total leaks caused by corrosion.58
Gas “services”, the pipes that carry gas from 
the mains to individual buildings, are also a sig-
nificant source of leaks. Prior to being bought out 
by National Grid, Brooklyn Union Gas Co. under-
took an aggressive replacement program, elimi-
nating leak-prone components and improving the 
integrity of the distribution system. Today, only 7 
percent of National Grid’s service lines were in-
stalled prior to 1960 and only 5 percent are made 
of unprotected steel and cast iron. The respective 
figures for Con Edison are 22 percent and 24 per-
cent. Con Edison had 58 leaks per 10,000 services 
with 849 total leaks caused by corrosion, while 
National Grid had 12 leaks per 10,000 services 
with 238 total leaks caused by corrosion.59
Replacing a mile of main in New York City 
costs approximately $2.2 to $8 million. Con Edi-
son is targeting the replacement of an average of 
30 miles of cast iron pipe each year, but a more 
aggressive replacement schedule may be war-
ranted. 
Failure to address leak-prone pipes could 
have environmental consequences. According to 
Bill McKibben, a prominent environmentalist, 
methane released from unburned natural gas is 
20 to 100 times as potent a greenhouse gas as car-
bon dioxide. If more than 2 to 3 percent of gas 
escapes into the atmosphere from the point of ex-
traction to its final destination, natural gas can do 
significant damage to the climate.60 In New York 
City, 1.5 percent of National Grid’s gas is unac-
counted for and 2.2 percent61 of gas entering Con 
Edison’s mains and service pipes—only the final 
stage in the extraction-transmission-distribution 
process—did not reach a final customer in 2012.62 
Theft and inaccurate meter readings play a part 
but so do leaks from old mains and services. Na-
tional Grid and Con Edison’s line losses compare 
favorably to peer companies in Philadelphia (2.7 
percent) and Boston (4.4 percent), but it is still 
cause for concern.
Despite these environmental issues, the low 
price of natural gas as well as the Bloomberg ad-
ministration’s 2011 decision to ban of heating oil 
#4 and #6 will almost certainly increase demand 
for natural gas in the coming years. At the mo-
ment, though, New York does not have sufficient 
distribution capacity to meet this demand. This is 
particularly true in the Bronx. “In some cases we 
couldn’t connect buildings with the main gas line 
because the expenditure would be in the millions 
of dollars,” says Wilhelm Ronda, planning director 
at the Bronx borough president’s office. “This was 
a shock to me. The #6 and #4 fuels have a sun-
set in the coming years, but we can’t comply with 
these laws if we don’t have the infrastructure.”
Electricity Distribution
The importance of New York City’s electric 
supply cannot be overstated. Beyond power-
ing the City’s homes, offices and appliances, the 
most basic and critical city services rely on elec-
tric. Pumps transporting sewage from low lying 
neighborhoods, street and traffic lights guiding 
automobile and pedestrian traffic, the third rail of 
the subway, cell phone towers—each depends on 
the uninterrupted delivery of electricity.
NYC Electrical System:
Service by Overhead Wires
vs Underground Cables
Overhead 
Wire
Underground 
Cable
Bronx 2,679 10,901 
Brooklyn 3,552 27,317 
Manhattan - 21,216 
Queens 6,995 24,795 
Staten Island 5,019 2,748 
Total 18,245 86,977 
Source: Con Edison, “Electric System”
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The majority of New York City’s electric dis-
tribution system is underground. This protects 
feeder cables and transformers from inclem-
ent weather and provides significant redundan-
cy—electricity is routed through multiple paths 
underground, allowing two feeders to trip out 
without any disruption in service. The city has 
64 autonomous underground networks, ensuring 
that a disruption in distribution in Long Island 
City, for instance, never cascades to Rego Park. 
Given the redundancy and resiliency of its 
distribution networks, Con Edison enjoys the low-
est percentage of customer service disruptions 
in the United States. According to Francisco De 
Leon, associate professor of Engineering at NYU 
Poly, “Con Ed has a reliability that you cannot find 
anywhere in the country.” 
Not all New Yorkers, however, are serviced 
by an underground network. Overall, 18 percent 
of customers and 14 percent of the load are con-
nected through an aboveground radial system.63 
Not surprisingly, New Yorkers relying on over-
head wire are far more likely to experience out-
ages than those serviced by an underground net-
work. Last year in the Bronx, 364 of every 1,000 
radial customers experienced an outage, but only 
10 underground network customers. Residents in 
Brooklyn (355 vs. 16) and Queens (231 vs. 9) ex-
perienced a similar variation.64 In Staten Island, 
serviced exclusively by overhead wires, 343 of ev-
ery 1,000 residents experienced outages.
While the overhead wire networks across 
the five boroughs perform worse than the city’s 
underground networks, this is typical of all elec-
tricity systems everywhere. In fact, Con Edison’s 
radial system performs significantly better than 
its peers around the nation, where 1,120 of every 
1,000 customers experienced an outage,65 and the 
state, where outages occur for 970 of every 1,000 
customers.66
To monitor the performance of Con Edison’s 
radial system, the New York State Public Service 
Commission (PSC) sets an electricity reliability 
standard for each borough. In 2012, Con Edison 
easily surpassed this standard throughout the city. 
There were, however, individual overhead feed-
ers that did not meet the PSC standard in all four 
boroughs. Con Edison uses this ranking as part of 
their analysis and prioritization of feeder repair, 
maintenance, and relief work. Staten Island has 
the highest percentage of feeders that exceed the 
PSC annual interruption standard, 18.2 percent. 
It is followed by Queens (14.7 percent), Bronx 
(14.5 percent) and Brooklyn (10.3 percent).67
According to Irving Poy, director of planning 
and development for the Queens borough presi-
dent’s office, aboveground electric service creates 
vulnerabilities. “We’ve had outages in every ma-
jor storm,” he says. “The vulnerability is not good 
for anybody. It affects businesses and schools. You 
don’t see this in Manhattan.”
Moving cables and transformers below ground 
is very expensive. Con Ed cannot simply dig a 
hole and drop what’s on the poles into it. Different 
types of cable and transformers must be installed. 
Given the considerable expense, only some parts 
of the system can be moved. 
Water Mains
DEP manages a massive water system, orig-
inating in three upstate aqueducts and pass-
ing through vast reservoirs, tunnels and storage 
tanks before arriving in the city. While the agency 
is often commended for its expertise, problems 
are inevitable in such a monumental infrastruc-
ture network. Water main breaks, for instance, 
are a regular occurrence in the city. In fiscal year 
2013, there were more than 400 of them across 
the five boroughs, and in January 2014, a major 
break flooded the street and nearby subways on 
13th Street in lower Manhattan, disrupting New 
Yorkers’ commutes for hours.68 To DEP’s credit, 
preventative maintenance and the monitoring of 
water pressure has reduced the number of water 
main breaks over the last decade. However, the 
Water Main Replacement
PlaNYC Target 
Replacement Rate: 
80 mi/yr
Actual
Replacement Rate: 
27 mi/yr
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number of breaks spiked by 10 percent in 2013 
and there have been at least 400 breaks in all but 
one year since 1998. 
According to the last publicly available inven-
tory, 46 percent of New York City’s 6,785 miles of 
water main were built prior to 1941.69 Approxi-
mately 1,000 miles are over 100 years old.70 The 
2,200 miles of pipe laid before 1930 are unlined 
cast iron. Another 2,400 miles are cement lined 
cast iron installed between 1930 and 1969.71 Both 
materials are inferior to the flexible ductile iron 
used today and are susceptible to internal corro-
sion and prone to leak. 
The diameter of the mains is also an issue. 
The Army Corp of Engineers has concluded that 
six-inch mains are four times more likely to break 
than those 12 inches or wider.72 Five percent of 
New York’s water pipe inventory is less than or 
equal to six inches in diameter with another 46 
percent only eight inches wide.73
The agency’s ability to stave off water main 
leaks and breaks has been negatively impacted 
by federal mandates requiring it to spend billions 
on projects such as a new ultraviolet disinfection 
plant for its Catskill/Delaware supply and a filtra-
tion plant for Croton water. The combined cost of 
these projects exceeded $5 billion, leaving fewer 
resources to plow into other critical components 
of its water network. “Unfunded [federal] man-
dates sucked up billions of dollars of the capital 
program and left very little for the water distribu-
tion system,” says former DEP Deputy Commis-
sioner Robert Adamski. “Now that some of those 
mandated projects are nearing completion, the 
city doesn’t seem to be redirecting [funds] to the 
distribution and collection systems.”    
DEP aspires to a 100-year replacement cycle 
for its water mains, replacing 1 percent per year, 
according to Timothy Burns of the New York State 
Environmental Facilities Corp.74 Accounting for 
the size of the city’s water delivery system, this 
is equivalent to 68 miles of water mains being re-
placed each year. (In PlaNYC, the city set an even 
more ambitious goal of replacing 80 miles of wa-
ter mains annually.) DEP has not reached this tar-
get on a single occasion since Fiscal Year 2002. 
Leaky Pipes: Percent of Water 
Unaccounted for by Borough, 2011
Distribution
(Million
Gallons per 
Day)
Consump-
tion (Million 
Gallons per 
Day)
%
Unaccounted
For
Manhattan 334 258 23%
Bronx 203 138 32%
Brooklyn 298 205 31%
Queens 197 171 13%
Staten Island 46 42 9%
NYC 1,078 814 24%
Source: NYC Dept. of Environmental Protection, “Water Conservation Report Annual 
Update,” June 2012
Source: NYC Dept. of Environmental Protection, “Water Conservation Pro-
gram,” December 2006
Water Pipe Inventory
by Year of Installation
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New and Replaced Water Mains Per Year, 2003-2013
DEP aspires to replace an average of 1 percent of the city’s water mains each year,
which would mean 68 miles of water mains replaced per year, but the agency has not
met this target once over the past decade. 
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To make up for the accumulated deficit over 
the last eleven years, the city would need to install 
411 miles of new water main in the upcoming fis-
cal year, equivalent to what the DEP has installed 
in the last ten years combined. In a 2006 report 
submitted to the state Department of Environ-
mental Conservation, the DEP restated their com-
mitment to replace 1,120 miles from 1996-2015.75 
Thus far it has installed only 840 miles of mains. 
To fulfill its commitment, the DEP must construct 
280 miles in the next two years, 3.5 times more 
than its annual average over the last decade. 
Given the age of New York’s water mains, it is 
little surprise that water leaks are rampant. City-
wide, the unaccounted-for-water rate—the dif-
ference between the amount of water that enters 
distribution mains and the amount that reaches 
customers—is a staggering 24 percent, double 
the 10-to-15 percent industry standard. Condi-
tions are especially bad in the Bronx (32 percent), 
Brooklyn (31 percent) and Manhattan (23 per-
cent).76
Sewage Pipes
In the middle of the 19th century, downtown 
New York resembled a cesspool. Streets were 
clogged with household garbage, animal corps-
es and human waste.  Bacteria from fecal mat-
ter leached into the water supply, precipitating a 
deadly cholera epidemic.  To combat the outbreak 
of disease, the first sewer system was construct-
ed in 1849. Between 1850 and 1855, more than 
70 miles of pipes were installed beneath the city 
streets. Today, 6,400 miles77 of sewer lines criss-
cross the city.
Most of New York’s original sewage pipes re-
main in service today. A significant percent of the 
pipes are over 100 years old78 and two thirds were 
installed prior to 1940.79
Approximately 4,000 miles of sewer pipe are 
made of vitreous clay.80 These older, earthenware 
pipes are more susceptible to cracking and block-
age and require vigilant monitoring and repair. 
Investment in the sewer system has become in-
creasingly urgent due to rising sea levels. As the 
water table climbs above the sewer lines, cracked 
pipes are susceptible to infiltration. Entering wa-
ter can wear away the pipes, creating bigger and 
bigger holes. Treating clean groundwater is a 
waste of energy and, on rainy days, its influx can 
overtax the water treatment plants. 
Though the sewer system is in need of im-
mediate investment, it has not received it. “Water 
and wastewater does not get enough recognition,” 
says Timothy Burns, director of engineering at 
the Environmental Facilities Corp. which provides 
funding and equipment for projects in New York 
state. “The infrastructure is below ground and out 
of the public’s eye. We see roads, airports and rail 
and are thus more willing to pay for it than they 
are water and wastewater.”
Since the turn of the century, the number of 
sewer lines constructed or reconstructed has fall-
en. From Fiscal Year 2000 to 2006, the DEP in-
stalled an average of 42 miles of sewers per year. 
From Fiscal Year 2007 to 2013, the average fell to 
17 miles.81
In sections of the city, sewage pipes are absent 
entirely. Homes rely on septic systems to treat 
wastewater on-site. In other neighborhoods, there 
Source: NYC Environmental Protection, “What is a Combined Sewer Overflow?”
Location of Active Sewage Overflows into New York Harbor,
By Severity (Type 1 = Most Severe)
Type of Outfall Staten Island Brooklyn Queens Manhattan Bronx Total
Tier 1 0 3 6 0 4 13
Tier 2 0 6 6 0 3 15
Tier 3 2 7 9 15 10 43
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Miles of Constructed and
Reconstructed Sewers
40.4
53.6
72.1
34.1
32.3
34.7
28.6
23.9
22.5
16.3
14.8
10.7
14.3
18.7
Sewage Pipe Inventory
by Year of Installation
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Source: NYC Municipal Water Finance Authority, Water and Sewer System 
Revenue Bonds, Fiscal 2001 Series A 
Source: Mayor’s Management Report 2001-2014
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are sanitary, but not storm sewers. Rainwater is 
collected in drywells and other temporary mea-
sures. “In parts of southeast Queens, you can have 
a little drizzle and there will be flooding,” says Ir-
ving Poy at the Queens borough president’s of-
fice. “Streets and basements are inundated, there 
are major problems with mold.” Although the city 
has developed a drainage plan for southeastern 
Queens, inadequate funding has slowed progress.
Stormwater Management
Like many older cities, New York has a com-
bined sewer system. Sanitary sewage and storm-
water runoff are collected in the same pipes and 
directed to the local waste-water treatment plant. 
On a clear day, this poses no problem; every one 
of the city’s 14 treatment plants has sufficient ca-
pacity to handle intake during dry weather. Dur-
ing rainfall, however, excess flow is diverted to 
a combined sewer overflow (CSO) location and 
discharged, untreated, into the city’s waterways. 
Overflow occurs about half the time it rains, lead-
ing to an estimated 27 billion gallons of raw sew-
age and polluted stormwater pouring into New 
York’s waterways every year.82
Certain areas of the city suffer more than 
others. While overflow can be discharged into 
the harbor from over 400 outfall locations scat-
tered throughout New York, the majority are in-
active. The discharge at just 13 locations accounts 
for 50 percent of total CSO volume. Six of these 
so-called Tier-1 outfalls are in Queens, four are 
in the Bronx and three are in Brooklyn. An ad-
ditional 15 Tier-2 outfalls make up 20 percent of 
total CSOs. Six each are in Queens and Brooklyn 
and three are in the Bronx.  The remaining Tier-3 
locations are more evenly distributed among the 
five boroughs, but contribute only 10 percent of 
total outfall.83
Stormwater management in Brooklyn, the 
Bronx and especially Queens is clearly an is-
sue. Bronx River, Alley Creek, Hutchinson River, 
Coney Island Creek and Flushing Bay all do not 
comply with the water quality standards mandat-
ed by the federal Clean Water Act. 
High CSO outfalls in the boroughs outside 
of Manhattan are at least partly attributable to 
population growth. Many of the oldest waste-
water treatment plants are in southern Brook-
lyn and eastern Queens, including Coney Island 
(1935), Owls Head in Bay Ridge (1952), Jamaica 
(1943) and Bowery Bay near Flushing (1939). As 
the local population grew, the storage capacity 
of each facility became increasingly inadequate. 
Treatment plants must have a substantial surplus 
capacity on dry days in order to handle sewage 
during rainstorms. While New York’s 14 treatment 
plants have a spare capacity of 28 percent on an 
average day, the four facilities in Southern Brook-
lyn and Queens have a surplus of only 20 percent. 
 To address the problem, DEP recently 
launched an aggressive green infrastructure cam-
paign to make the city more permeable and better 
able to soak up rainwater. Bioswales, green roofs, 
and porous pavement have become increasingly 
prevalent, particularly in demonstration areas 
in Brooklyn, the Bronx and the Queens. The city 
plans to commit $2.4 billion in public and private 
investment over the next 18 years to increase 
these efforts.84
The emphasis on green infrastructure repre-
sents a shift in the city’s stormwater strategy. Un-
der a 2005 Order of Consent with the state, New 
York City is required to reduce combined sewer 
overflows. Prior to 2012, it achieved this primar-
ily through traditional practices for stormwater 
management known as gray infrastructure. This 
included construction of three underground re-
tention facilities that temporarily hold excess 
sewage. The largest, near Paerdegat Basin, will re-
duce overflow discharges in the Jamaica Bay trib-
utary by 70 percent—from 1.833 billion gallons to 
555 million gallons per year.85 In comparison, the 
city’s 2,536 Greenstreet sites capture 105 million 
gallons of stormwater86 annually and its 100 bio-
swales retain 1,870 gallons apiece.87 Although im-
pressive, it pales in comparison to the magnitude 
of the problem: 27 billion annual CSOs.
Green infrastructure is a tremendous asset to 
the city. It simultaneously beautifies New York’s 
neighborhoods while alleviating severe gaps in 
the stormwater management system. But city offi-
cials will likely have to invest in more traditional 
mitigation efforts as well if they are ever going to 
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dramatically reduce CSO discharges. In fact, the 
federal EPA has recently deemed the city’s green 
infrastructure proposals near the Gowanus Canal 
in Brooklyn insufficient and called on the city to 
build two storage tanks instead of or in addition 
to those projects.88
Broadband Infrastructure
Over the past decade, the city’s telecommu-
nications infrastructure has arguably become as 
important to New York’s economic competiveness 
as electricity or clean water. At a time when New 
York hopes to overtake Silicon Valley as the na-
tion’s leading technology hub and when much of 
the city’s overall economic growth comes from 
companies built around the Internet and mobile 
technology, the ability to access a reliable, high-
speed Internet connection is a foundation for 
economic success. Unfortunately, the city’s broad-
band infrastructure is lacking in many ways. 
The good news is that the vast majority of New 
York City businesses and residents have no prob-
lem accessing a broadband connection. According 
to recent report, 97 percent of city residents have 
residential access to high-speed broadband.89
For an unacceptable number of the city’s busi-
nesses, however, broadband service is spotty and 
unreliable. In too many commercial buildings, In-
ternet download speeds do not meet the needs of 
today’s companies—particularly those in the tech 
sector. While the city’s largest corporations enjoy 
service at speeds above 100 megabits per second 
(Mbps), a level that is typical in many countries, 
many smaller firms located in older Class B and C 
buildings do not. When we interviewed dozens of 
the city’s tech company founders and executives 
for our 2012 New Tech City report, the inadequate 
state of broadband connectivity was the second 
most frequently cited threat to New York’s future 
growth in the tech sector. 
Beyond the slow speeds, several tech compa-
nies say that their Internet connection goes down 
from time to time, causing considerable business 
disruptions. Some companies located in older of-
fice buildings—particularly in the former indus-
trial areas that are now thriving hubs for tech and 
creative businesses—say that another problem is 
a lack of redundancy. They may be perfectly hap-
py with broadband service from Verizon FiOS, but 
worry that, if it goes down, they will not have any 
backup because their buildings are not equipped 
for business cable broadband service from Time 
Warner. 
“Most commercial buildings do not have busi-
ness cable broadband service (provided by Time 
Warner Cable),” says Dana Spiegel, executive di-
rector of NYC Wireless. “When it is available, this 
service can have technical issues (with laten-
cy and uptime) and is also highly asymmetrical 
(50Mbps down and at most 5Mbps upload speed), 
which is bad for business use. Even fewer com-
mercial-only buildings have Verizon FiOS.”90
In some commercial buildings outside of 
Manhattan, it remains difficult to get any broad-
band connection. The gaps are mainly limited to a 
handful of former industrial neighborhoods—in-
cluding several along the Brooklyn and Queens 
waterfront—but are a concern given that the 
buildings in these districts now attract tech com-
panies, creative businesses, artisanal manufac-
Source: Fitchard, Kevin, “Which Borough Has the Fastest 4G in NYC? Sorry 
Manhattan, it’s the Bronx,” Gigaom, January 31, 2013.
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turers and other companies that require a fast 
Internet connection. In many of these buildings, 
the telecommunications infrastructure is rough-
ly 100 years old. When they were mainly filled 
with manufacturers, telecom carriers like Verizon 
never saw enough demand to justify the huge up-
front cost of building out fiber optic lines to these 
buildings. And since these districts had few resi-
dential customers, cable television companies like 
Time Warner and Cablevision never developed 
the infrastructure to serve them. The city’s major 
telecommunications providers are making prog-
ress in wiring buildings in these areas, but gaps 
remain. 
The city’s Economic Development Corp. has 
tried to fill the gap with its ConnectNYC program, 
financing fiber construction for select businesses. 
While this is an encouraging development, the 
corporation has received only $14 million to fi-
nance the program, limiting its impact.91
Broadband access is less of a problem in the 
city’s residential buildings. Overall, only 101,000 
New York City households have no access to 
broadband.92 This comes out to 245,000 residents 
across the five boroughs, including 75,000 in 
Brooklyn, 67,500 in Queens, 47,500 in Manhattan, 
41,500 in the Bronx and 14,000 in Staten Island.93 
The overall access rate across the five boroughs is 
higher than similar rates for the state and nation. 
There are other broadband infrastructure 
challenges. Connectivity is inadequate in many 
of the city’s schools, a major problem given the 
increasing importance of technology and science, 
technology, engineering and math education. As of 
July 2013, in 75 percent of New York City schools, 
maximum Internet speeds were 10 Mbps or less. 
Depending on the time of day and the number of 
students accessing the network, most schools will 
not be able to offer speeds exceeding 4 Mbps—
the minimum threshold for watching video lec-
tures and other online learning tools.94
New Yorkers in every borough also are ham-
pered by patchy cell phone service and slow mo-
bile broadband speeds. This is largely due to the 
density of the population and the multitude of 
buildings, reflective glass and water bodies inter-
fering with signals.95 These conditions are most 
prevalent in Manhattan, producing the slowest 
average mobile data speeds in the five boroughs. 
The average download speed is 9.3 Mbps in Man-
hattan compared to 13.5 in the Bronx, 11.6 in 
Staten Island, 11.4 in Queens and 9.6 in Brook-
lyn.96
Mobile phone carriers often have difficulty 
placing cell sites and back-up generators on pri-
vate buildings in the city. Negotiations with indi-
vidual landlords are time consuming and the ac-
quisition of city permits is cumbersome. Several 
agencies are involved in the approval process, 
including the Fire Department, Department of 
Buildings and, occasionally, the Landmarks Com-
mission. Streamlining this process would increase 
the density and reliability of cell sites, improving 
access to mobile broadband. “There is a growing 
need for coverage and capacity,” says David Bron-
ston, special counsel at the law firm Phillips Lytle. 
“There are more devices than people in this coun-
try. Infrastructure needs to get closer and closer 
to the end user. We can’t have towers in New York. 
It needs to be on rooftops, light poles and pay-
phones.” 
While cell sites may provide mobile access, 
they themselves are hardly wireless. Each is 
supported by “backhaul” connecting them to the 
larger telecommunications network. The copper, 
coaxial and fiber cables that underlay wireless 
technologies also provide broadband directly to 
homes and businesses. Of the three cable materi-
als, fiber is by far the fastest and most resilient. 
Fortunately, almost all of New York City is covered 
by this material. Under a 2008 agreement with the 
city, Verizon must lay fiber on every residential 
block by June 30, 2014. Thus far, it has fulfilled 91 
percent of its commitment.97 This does not, how-
ever, mean that 91 percent of residential build-
ings have access to fiber, only that fiber “passes” 
91 percent of homes. To connect every building 
to the fiber running down the middle of its street 
will demand affirmative action from Verizon, 
landlords, tenants and the city government.
Government IT systems
In today’s era of “smart cities,” quality gov-
ernance increasingly depends on modern infor-
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mation technology infrastructure. Over the last 
decade, the city’s Department of Information 
Technology and Telecommunications (DoITT) 
has introduced a number of innovations to help 
usher New York into the 21st century. Its open 
data platform offers more than 1,100 public data 
sets. The recently introduced DataShare enables 
agencies to transmit and receive data in real-time 
while the Data Bridge platform allows city em-
ployees to use this data for advanced statistical 
analysis. Still, despite this progress, much of New 
York City’s IT infrastructure remains dated and 
fractured.  
Numerous city agencies continue to store data 
and host applications on mainframe computers 
supported by antiquated software tools. For in-
stance, mainframes operated by the city’s Depart-
ment of Information Technology and Telecommu-
nications (DoITT) currently run approximately 
170 applications on DB2 and ADABAS, database 
management systems released in 1983 and 1970, 
respectively. All DB2 applications are written in 
Cobol, a programming language introduced in 
1959. 
To maintain and update these applications, 
the city depends on a dwindling pool of techni-
cians who have expertise in these decades-old 
programming systems. Many of them are on the 
verge of retirement. “Antiquated digital infra-
structure affects personnel and hiring for tech-
nology jobs in the city,” says Jeff Maki, product 
development manager at Control Group, a New 
York based innovation strategy firm. “Ultimately, 
it is off-putting to young technologists. It mires 
the city in its older skill set that pushes them even 
further back from progress.”
The city’s fractured IT infrastructure often 
prevents different city agencies from communi-
cating or collaborating effectively. For instance, 
despite serving an overlapping population, health 
and human service agencies like the Department 
of Health and Mental Hygiene, Department of 
Homeless Services and Human Resources Admin-
istration use customer relationship management 
applications that are custom built and hosted in-
dividually. The health department, for instance, 
cannot easily see if one of its clients entered a 
homeless shelter a week prior. This technologi-
cal barrier makes it difficult for the Department 
of Health and Human Services to offer integrated 
service plans.98
Faced with the need for more mobile and 
more modern technology, many city agencies 
have opted to independently contract with third-
party cloud operators like Amazon or Rackspace. 
While this may address the agency’s immediate 
needs, it means that data is stored outside of the 
city system without a coordinated vision for in-
tegrating information across agencies or even 
among bureaus within an agency. If the city estab-
lished a single contract with third party vendors 
via DoITT, externally hosted applications could 
be better integrated and, given the consolidated 
buying power, less expensive. 
Decentralized technological policies also hob-
ble efforts to make data open, accessible and user 
friendly. Agency datasets are rarely standardized-
-lacking consistent labeling, agreed-upon defi-
nitions or a common set of properties--and thus 
difficult to integrate. Three-quarters of the city’s 
open datasets are manually updated,99 a process 
that is expensive, slow and prone to human error. 
A source at DoITT confirms, “Not a huge amount 
of money has been dedicated to the open data ef-
fort yet. It is constrained by a lack of resources.” 
Funding is still needed to support “the analysis 
and automation of the information we get from 
agencies.” Annual allocations to the open data 
project are set to decline by 14 percent in the 
coming years, from $224,449 in 2013 to $192,688 
in 2017.    
In October 2010, Mayor Michael Bloomberg 
issued Executive Order 140, a plan to consolidate 
the city’s outmoded and fractured IT systems. 
DoITT would assume control of data storage, ap-
plication hosting, procurement and technology 
policy. Thus far, however, progress has been slow. 
Less than half of the city’s data centers have been 
consolidated,100 and agencies continue to unilat-
erally purchase and customize software, forego-
ing economies of scale, complicating maintenance 
and upgrades, and preventing interoperability 
across applications.
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When most people consider infrastructure, they 
think of bridges, train tracks, and electric substa-
tions. But, like transportation and utilities, parks, 
schools and homeless shelters facilitate social 
and economic interactions. They too are “pub-
lic goods,” operated by government or publically 
funded and regulated authorities, and they repre-
sent parts of our infrastructure. 
New York’s public spaces share another, un-
fortunate, characteristic with transportation and 
utility infrastructure: They are very old. An as-
tounding 209 of the city’s 1,179 school buildings 
were built prior to 1920. Sixty-one percent of city-
owned courthouses were erected before 1940. 
The average city hospital building is 57 years 
old.101 And over 75 percent of the New York City 
Housing Authority’s (NYCHA) 2,596 residential 
buildings have stood for more than four decades.
The city’s expansive and highly trafficked 
parks also are aging. Seven of the 25 oldest and 
six of the most visited parks in the nation are in 
New York City.102
Like the parks department, the City University 
of New York (CUNY) and NYCHA handle a large 
portfolio spread across the city. CUNY operates a 
senior college in every borough and a community 
college in all but Staten Island. Its 25 campuses 
span 800 acres and its 295 buildings cover 28 
million square feet.103 NYCHA’s footprint is even 
larger. With 334 developments covering 2,555 
acres, it is among the largest landholders in the 
city. Managing these old and geographically dis-
persed facilities has proven difficult. CUNY cam-
puses have accumulated $2.5 billion in deferred 
capital maintenance. NYCHA’s capital shortfall is 
projected to reach $14 billion over the next five 
years.104
  
NYC School Buildings
During the Bloomberg administration, the 
School Construction Authority (SCA) carried out 
an unprecedented campaign to build new schools. 
Buoyed by generous building aid from the state, 
the SCA directed $25 billion to building and mod-
ernizing city schools. In total, 126,000 new school 
seats have been added since 2002.105
While the SCA’s historic funding levels have 
helped address overcapacity issues and begun to 
modernize existing facilities, New York’s schools 
are old and continue to demand constant mainte-
nance and rehab. The average school building in 
the five boroughs was constructed in 1948.106 Of 
the 1,179 school buildings in the DOE portfolio, 
170 are more than a century old and 370 predate 
the Great Depression. 
Brooklyn’s schools are the oldest in the city. 
The average is over 70 years old and 77 have been 
standing for more than a century. Not surpris-
PUBLIC STRUCTURES AND SPACES
New York’s public spaces show their age as budgets fail to meet a crying need for repairs and 
modernization
Aging Public Buildings and Spaces
Number of 
Buildings
Average 
Year Built
HHC Hospital Buildings 103 1957
CUNY Buildings 295 1961
DOE School Buildings 1,179 1948
NYPD Precinct Houses 49 1952
City-Owned Court Buildings 23 1943
DHS Homeless Shelters 55 1943
NYCHA Developments 2,596 1963
Source: OMB Asset Investment Management Report, Agency Reconciliation, Fiscal 
Year 2013
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ingly, Brooklyn’s schools have the greatest state-
of-good-repair needs: $466.3 million according to 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as-
set management report. Unfortunately, only $71.4 
million has been pledged in the four-year capi-
tal commitment plan, or 15 percent of its capital 
needs. By comparison, 22 percent of Manhattan’s 
state of good repair needs will be covered, 18 
percent of Staten Island’s, 17 percent of Queens’, 
and 16 percent in the Bronx. These figures in-
clude only line-item state of good repair needs, 
not funding for upgrades, modernizations, com-
pliance and conversions that will also be directed 
to borough schools.  
Many, if not most, of the city’s public schools 
face infrastructure challenges. In a comprehen-
sive building assessment survey commissioned 
by the SCA in 2012, school principals complained 
about insufficient lighting, broken heating, ven-
tilation and cooling systems, leaky roofs, broken 
public announcement systems and even power 
outages. In the same survey, visiting engineers 
ranked building components on a scale of from 1 
to 5, with a score of one representing “good condi-
tion,” a three signifying “fair condition” and a five 
indicating “poor condition.” A score over three 
recommends “preventive maintenance to prevent 
further deterioration and to restore it to a good 
condition.”107 Throughout the five boroughs, ar-
chitectural systems in 36 facilities, electrical sys-
Source: OMB Asset investment Management Report, Agency Reconciliation, 
Fiscal Year 2013
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Repairing Aging Schools: Capital Needs vs Funding Committed, by Borough
Borough Average Year Built Capital Needs FY2014-17 Dollars Committed % Committed
Bronx 1953 $253,638,400 $39,648,464 16%
Brooklyn 1942 $466,260,300 $71,403,022 15%
Manhattan 1947 $234,655,800 $52,106,135 22%
Queens 1951 $258,427,400 $43,563,789 17%
Staten Island 1949 $75,681,400 $13,497,652 18%
Grand Total 1948 $1,290,484,600 $220,219,062 17%
31%
of NYC’s public school buildings
 predate the Great Depression
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tems in four facilities and mechanical systems in 
69 facilities were ranked above a three. These in-
clude a number of annexes and trailers that are 
well past their useful life (but excludes athletic 
fields that were also surveyed). Deteriorating as-
sets were most common in Brooklyn, where 41 
building systems scored higher than three com-
pared to 31 in the Bronx, 15 in Queens, and 11 in 
Manhattan and Staten Island.
The DOE also must deal with 348 “temporary” 
trailers built to relieve overcrowding. Located at 
119 schools across the city, nearly 80 percent of 
the trailers predate 2000. “The trailers are in very 
poor condition and are rotting away,” says Leonie 
Haimson, founder of Class Size Matters, an edu-
cation advocacy group. “Over the last eight years, 
they said that the capital plan would get rid of 
the trailers. Yet we have as many as we did eight 
years ago. There is a lot of leaking and a lot of 
mold. This is a crisis in schools across the city.”
Nearly half of the DOE’s “transportable class-
room units” (TCU), or trailers, are located in 
Queens, where school overcrowding remains a 
major problem. Though the city as a whole has 8 
percent more school seats than students, Queens 
schools are 4 percent overcapacity with five of its 
seven school districts overcrowded. To address 
this deficiency, the DOE has sited 153 trailers 
in the borough, far more than in the Bronx (85), 
Brooklyn (80), Manhattan (21) or Staten Island 
(13). 
 The trailers take up valuable outdoor recre-
ation space and compromise students’ health and 
safety. Dilsia Martinez, the principal at PS 163 in 
the Bronx, reports, “One of [my] top concerns is 
the aging TCUs. The floors are rotting. There are 
holes in the structure. Heating and cooling sys-
tems are failing. Plumbing lines are blocked up. 
Most of all, the fire alarms in the main building 
and those installed in the TCUs do not interface.”
NYCHA 
The New York City Housing Authority 
(NYCHA) is made up of over 330 developments 
with 2,600 buildings and 179,000 apartments 
scattered throughout the five boroughs. Keeping 
these buildings, which house well over 400,000 
tenants, in a state of good repair is a herculean 
task that grows more difficult with every passing 
year. 
The majority of NYCHA developments were 
constructed between 1940 and 1960. Over 75 per-
cent of its residential buildings are more than 40 
years old and 531 have been standing since at 
least 1950.108 To maintain its aging housing stock, 
NYCHA relies on capital dollars from the federal 
government. This funding has fallen precipitously 
since the end of the Clinton administration, from 
$420 million in 2001 to $256 million today.109 As 
funding dwindles and buildings age, the backlog 
of deferred capital spending has exploded.  Over 
the next five years, NYCHA’s capital shortfall will 
reach a staggering $14 billion.110
“NYCHA developments are in serious ne-
glect,” says City Council Member Rosie Mendez, 
former chair of the council’s public housing com-
mittee. “Roofs are leaking and mold does not get 
repaired and it takes three years to get a simple 
hole repaired. [There’s a] chronic budget deficit 
and when the federal government shortchanges 
you, you need to triage. Much needed repair goes 
on the back burner and then new problems arise.”
Over the last decade, NYCHA has become 
more successful at “triaging” in the face of dwin-
dling funding. Capital and operations manage-
ment are working together more closely, strate-
gically replacing overdue boilers, plumbing, and 
electric equipment when maintenance costs be-
come exorbitant. The Authority has also taken 
an aggressive approach toward modernizing its 
elevators, replacing over two-thirds in the last 
decade. Still, intelligent capital planning cannot 
compensate for severe funding shortfalls at the 
44%
of the 348 DOE “temporary” trailers are 
located in Queens schools, far more than 
in the Bronx (24 percent), Brooklyn (23 
percent), Manhattan (6 percent) or Staten 
Island (4 percent) 
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NYCHA Capital Needs,
By System (2011-2016)
Category Building System
Apartment $7,589,395,862 
Architectural $6,702,844,647 
Electrical $217,035,495 
Mechanical $1,171,173,158 
Building Grounds $892,498,929 
Total $16,572,948,091 
Source:  NYCHA, “Physical Needs Assessment,” 2011
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10 NYCHA Developments
in the Worst Condition
Development Borough Score
Butler Bronx 39
Red Hook I (East) Brooklyn 42
Morrisania Bronx 44
Lower East Side II Manhattan 46
Murphy Bronx 46
Albany I & II Brooklyn 47
Van Dyke I Brooklyn 48
Castle Hill Bronx 49
FHA Repossesed Houses V Queens 50
Andrew Jackson Bronx 51
Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Public Housing Asset 
Management
NYCHA Developments with Greatest 
Façade Needs (2011-2016)
Development Borough Capital Needs
Pomonok Queens $124,375,134 
Ravenswood Queens $108,482,664 
Breukelen Brooklyn $96,795,137 
Williamsburg Brooklyn $93,880,399 
Queensbridge South Queens $89,341,132 
Marcy Brooklyn $88,494,261 
Edenwald Bronx $80,770,819 
Queensbridge North Queens $73,497,817 
Castle Hill Bronx $72,118,946 
Sotomayor Bronx $70,885,992 
Patterson Bronx $70,002,441 
Source:  NYCHA, “Physical Needs Assessment,” 2011
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federal, state, and city level. Without sufficient 
spending, the city’s public housing will continue 
to decay.  
Of NYCHA’s 2,600 buildings, a staggering 
1,500 do not comply with Local Law 11 standards 
for exterior and façade conditions.111 A Physi-
cal Needs Assessment commissioned by NYCHA 
in 2011 found $621 million in immediate façade 
needs and $6.7 billion over the next five years, far 
greater than the $580 million allotted for brick-
work and roofs in the current five year plan.112 
This is in addition to the $7.6 billion needed to re-
habilitate apartments, $1.2 billion for mechanical 
systems, $893 million for building grounds and 
$217 million for electrical equipment.
Physical inspections performed by the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) confirm the degraded conditions of 
NYCHA’s housing stock. HUD inspections survey 
the grounds, exteriors, mechanical systems, com-
munal areas and individual units at every NYCHA 
property.113 Properties are scored from 1 to 100, 
with the average property receiving a 72. Butler 
in the Bronx was the most degraded development 
in the NYCHA portfolio, followed by Red Hook I 
(Brooklyn), Morrisania (Bronx), Lower East Side 
II (Manhattan) and Murphy (Bronx). Of the 10 
worst performing developments, five are located 
in the Bronx, three in Brooklyn and one apiece in 
Manhattan and Queens.
Developments in Queens have the most dete-
riorated building facades and roofs, according to 
HUD inspections. The average building exterior 
or “envelope” in Queens scored 69, compared to 
78 in Staten Island and Brooklyn, 79 in Manhat-
tan and 81 in the Bronx. Not surprisingly, given 
the collateral damage of leaking exteriors, Queens 
also has the lowest ranked dwelling unit scores 
and the worst overall score. 
Eleven NYCHA developments need over $70 
million in façade repairs through 2016. These 
include the Pomonok, Ravenswood and Queens-
bridge South complexes in Queens and the 
Breukelen, Williamsburg and Marcy complexes in 
Brooklyn.
Examining the last five NYCHA capital bud-
get plans, it is easy to see how its developments 
fell into disrepair. At the Andrew Jackson Houses, 
for instance, roof repairs have been delayed for 
years. “Our roofs are horrible,” says Daniel Barber, 
resident association president at Andrew Jackson 
Houses. “I visited a resident [recently]. When it 
rained, she had flood conditions pouring into her 
apartment.”
Water infiltration is a major issue across the 
NYCHA portfolio. When bricks, roofs and win-
dows leak, problems quickly spread to the interi-
or. Sheet rock crumbles leaving holes in walls and 
collapsed ceilings. Mold spreads quickly, compro-
mising air quality. Nearly a quarter of children 
living in public housing suffer from asthma—10 
percent higher than the rate among all New York 
City children.114
Extreme temperatures, collapsed ceilings and 
persistent mold have left some apartments un-
inhabitable. Nearly 800 are currently vacant and 
“NYCHA developments are in serious neglect. Roofs 
are leaking and mold does not get repaired and it takes 
three years to get a simple hole repaired. [There’s a] 
chronic budget deficit and when the federal government 
shortchanges you, you need to triage. Much needed repair 
goes on the back burner and then new problems arise.”
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awaiting major renovation. Of these, 319 have 
been empty for an average of more than seven 
years. With over 220,000 names on the waiting list 
for NYCHA apartments, these vacancies only ex-
acerbate New York’s housing shortage.115
While degraded building envelopes continue 
to plague NYCHA properties, there are signs of 
progress. In September 2013, a $476 million bond 
deal was finalized. The funds will be devoted to 
sealing masonry and creating watertight roofs at 
24 housing developments.116 Unfortunately, this 
infusion of funding barely scratches the surface 
of what is needed. 
 
CUNY 
While the CUNY system was formally consoli-
dated in 1961, the majority of its campuses were 
founded much earlier. Across CUNY’s 24 campus-
es, the average building is 53 years old. Sixty-nine 
buildings were constructed more than 75 years 
ago and 34 have stood for at least a century.117
In 2007, CUNY funded a comprehensive audit 
of its aging infrastructure. The survey provided an 
overview of facility needs and calculated deferred 
capital investment, identifying a $1.7 billion 
backlog. Senior colleges and graduate schools ac-
counted for $1.27 billion and community colleges 
the remaining $466 million. The largest contribu-
tors to this backlog were renovations and replace-
ment of heating, ventilation and cooling systems 
(HVACs) ($700 million), exterior walls and roofs 
($277 million), and electrical equipment ($164 
million).118 Obsolete electrical systems are partic-
ularly disconcerting, as they hamper moderniza-
tion. Several campuses cannot install new com-
puter labs due to inadequate electrical capacity. 
CUNY recently performed a follow-up survey. 
The preliminary findings were not encouraging. 
Over the last five years, the capital backlog has 
increased by 47 percent, from $1.7 billion to $2.5 
billion. Deferred capital maintenance at senior 
colleges rose by 37 percent, to $1.7 billion, and by 
57 percent at community colleges, to $731 million. 
Of the 20 colleges surveyed, only four senior col-
leges and one community college saw a reduction 
in its capital backlog. “Community colleges have 
suffered particularly from deferred maintenance. 
These are the students who are struggling the 
most and their education isn’t any less important. 
They really need a commitment from the city,” 
says Robin Auchincloss, director of campus and 
facilities planning at Bronx Community College 
(BCC).
At BCC, the HVAC systems in most campus 
buildings are well beyond their useful life and 
do not provide code-compliant fresh air or air 
conditioning.119 A $12 million investment was re-
quested for 2012,120 but has been pushed back to 
2015.121 An $11 million electrical upgrade also has 
been pushed back three years.
At Queens College, much of the campus de-
pends on an unreliable 4160-volt electricity 
distribution system, leading to frequent power 
outages.122 At the College of Staten Island, pow-
er fluctuations in the Center for the Arts build-
ing cause spikes and dips that damage sensitive 
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CUNY Deferred Capital Maintenance by Institution (millions of dollars)
Institutions 2007 Backlog 2012 Backlog Difference
Baruch College 58.0 36.0 (22.0)
Brooklyn College 136.1 245.9 109.8 
City College of New York 337.5 438.4 100.9 
CUNY School of Law 11.1 9.1 (2.0)
The Graduate Center 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Hunter College 220.8 271.7 50.9 
John Jay College of Criminal Justice 51.0 85.2 34.2 
Lehman College 34.8 31.7 (3.1)
William E. Macaulay Honors College 2.1 4.0 1.9 
Medgar Evers College 50.2 78.9 28.7 
NYC College of Technology 134.5 105.9 (28.6)
Queens College 147.1 243.3 96.2 
College of Staten Island 49.5 61.9 12.4 
York College 38.5 135.0 96.5 
Senior College Subtotal 1271.2 1747.0 475.8 
Borough of Manhattan Community College 65.2 85.2 20.0 
Bronx Community College 100.6 175.4 74.8 
Hostos Community College 29.4 23.9 (5.5)
Kingsborough Community College 29.6 43.6 14.0 
LaGuardia Community College 154.8 233.5 78.7 
Queensborough Community College 85.9 169.2 83.3 
Community College Subtotal 465.5 730.8 265.3 
Grand Total 1736.7 2477.8 741.1 
Source: Sightlines LLC, “CUNY Renewal and Backlog,” December 2012
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equipment. With its outdated HVAC system, high 
humidity levels, mold and energy waste are com-
mon throughout campus buildings.123
At York College, deferred capital maintenance 
increased 251 percent from 2007 ($38.5 million) 
to 2012 ($135 million). A rise in the Queens wa-
ter table has had a particularly hazardous effect 
on campus facilities. Water levels have reached 
three feet above the basement floor of the Aca-
demic Core Building, necessitating the relocation 
of the electric distribution system. Waterproofing 
the interior of the basement and replacing dam-
aged electrical equipment will cost $30 million.124
Parks Department
New York is home to the country’s oldest, 
busiest and most expansive parks in the country. 
Seven of the nation’s 25 oldest parks are in New 
York and six of the 25 most visited.125 In all, the 
Parks Department maintains over 29,000 acres 
of property, covering 14 percent of the city and 
encompassing more than 1,000 playgrounds, 800 
athletic fields, 550 tennis courts, 55 outdoor swim-
ming pools, 14 miles of beaches, 13 golf courses, 
and four zoos.126
Despite its vast and diverse assets, the De-
partment of Parks is granted little autonomy over 
its capital budget. Instead, it relies on discretion-
ary capital allocations from council members and 
borough presidents for the majority of its proj-
ects. This precludes the Parks Department from 
planning and prioritizing investment, creates 
contracting delays, exacerbates disparities among 
neighborhood parks, and not surprisingly, favors 
more visible and popular projects (like play-
grounds) over more obscure assets (like bridges 
and retaining walls). 
While the majority of park bridges are main-
tained by the Department of Transportation, about 
two dozen “need to be brought up to a certain level 
of good repair before the DOT will take them on” 
according to John Natoli, the chief engineer for 
capital projects at the Parks Department. These 
distressed bridges include the Passerelle Bridge 
(a wooden esplanade from the 1939 World’s Fair), 
Porpoise Bridge (over Flushing River in Queens) 
and the Fort Washington Pedestrian Bridge (over 
Amtrak lines in Manhattan). Not surprisingly, 
funding is an issue. Natoli confirms that Parks 
“gets an allotment of money for bridges, but it’s 
insufficient. Some are in disrepair.”
Ongoing maintenance issues at parks are often 
a product of their location. “Many parks were in-
tentionally sited in locations because they weren’t 
fit for development,” says Alyson Beha, director 
of research, planning and policy at New Yorkers 
4 Parks. “We see the most problems in parks built 
on cliffs and hills—Morningside Park, St. Nicho-
las Park, Jackie Robinson Park, St. Mary’s Park, 
McNeil Park and Fort Greene Park.  As the earth 
moves and erodes, stairwells are left in disrepair.” 
Retaining walls in these parks need significant 
attention. While the Parks Department monitors 
bulges and cracks vigilantly, over $25 million in 
contracts have been prepared in case of failure. 
According to the AIMS report, three Bronx parks 
(Franz Sigel, Jerome Slope and University Woods) 
will need $1.6 million to fortify their retaining 
walls in the next four years. Manhattan parks, on 
the other hand, will need $24.2 million for retain-
ing walls, including $6.2 at Riverside Park, $6.1 
for Central Park, $3.3 at Fort Tryon, $2.6 for High-
bridge, $1.8 million at Jackie Robinson and $1.3 
million for Morningside.
Seawalls 
New York is a city of islands and peninsu-
las. Many of its most important assets, including 
its parks, ports and highways, are located at the 
shoreline. Seawalls protect this infrastructure, 
managing the tide and forestalling erosion. Ac-
cording to the OMB’s official estimates, New York 
has approximately $44 million in state of good re-
pair needs for its seawalls and has set aside only 
$9 million for repairs. But, according to experts, 
New York City has
7
of the nation’s 25 
oldest parks
6
of the nation’s 25 
most visited parks
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the problem is actually much bigger than OMB is 
letting on. One expert we talked to said that the 
seawalls around the East River promenade re-
quire wholesale demolition and reconstruction, 
which could cost over $100 million all by itself.
According to John Natoli, the chief engineer 
for capital projects at the Parks Department, most 
of New York’s seawalls were built 60 or 70 years 
ago. “They’re beyond their useful design life,” he 
says. “We’re patching them left and right. They re-
ally need several hundred million dollars to put a 
fence around it all, demolish it and rebuild it. If I 
were to leave the agency today, I’d say, ‘I wish we 
could have made a better argument for fixing the 
seawalls. This should have been dealt with.’”
Maintaining this essential infrastructure is 
complicated by their fractured management. 
In total, 10 city agencies oversee some portion 
of the city’s seawall infrastructure. This can be 
cumbersome, particularly when projects need 
approval from the state Department of Environ-
mental Conservation (DEC). Jack Schmidt, direc-
tor of transportation planning at the City Plan-
ning Department, explains, “With the seawall, if 
we had autonomy to do what we wanted, the pro-
cess would move a little more smoothly. But to get 
state DEC approval is a real pain. They have ridic-
ulous restrictions about what you can do where 
and how you can do it. The approval process is 
lengthy and it’s never guaranteed.”
Homeless Shelters
The Department of Homeless Services (DHS) 
is responsible for “providing temporary, emergen-
cy shelter for individuals and families who have 
no other housing options.” While this is a noble 
mandate, the department is severely constrained 
by substandard facilities. The 55 buildings oper-
ated by DHS are the oldest, largest and among the 
most desperate of the city’s 240 shelters. Leaking 
roofs, poor insulation, and heating and electrical 
failures plague these ancient facilities, impeding 
the delivery of critical services to vulnerable cli-
ents.
Over the next four years, city-owned shelters 
will need $50.3 million to achieve a state of good 
repair, according to the Asset Information Man-
agement System (AIMS) report. Only $7.7 million 
is budgeted for these facilities, however, leaving 
a $42.5 million gap. Manhattan’s 16 shelters are 
the oldest and the most neglected. From 2014 to 
2017, DHS is projected to cover only $3.7 million 
of Manhattan’s $30.7 million needs. The funding 
gaps in Brooklyn ($12,411,809) and the Bronx 
($2,402,407) are also substantial.
Of the $50.3 million in capital needs at DHS, 
nearly half is for exterior architecture. “The pri-
mary issue with city-owned buildings is the en-
velope, meaning the roofs, windows and brick 
pointing,” confirms Yianna Pavlakos, the DHS’s 
commissioner for facility maintenance and de-
velopment. “That is always a big challenge.” At 
some facilities, mold from persistent leaks has left 
rooms uninhabitable. In an already overcrowded 
system, the need to cordon off available capacity 
is devastating.
According to the AIMS report, six shelters will 
need over a million dollars each to rehabilitate 
their building envelopes. Only two, Fort Washing-
ton and Metropolitan, have been allocated partial 
funding to address these issues.127
According to Pavlakos, DHS is clearly not 
getting sufficient funding to do necessary capi-
tal work. “Unfortunately,” she says, “we’re in a 
situation where we’re basically asking ourselves 
‘what’s the biggest emergency?”
Parks Department Seawalls
Borough Capital Needs FY2014-17
Total
Committed
%
Committed
Bronx $7,341,900 $1,908,181 26%
Brooklyn $6,753,000  $0 0%
Manhattan $15,893,700 $6,409,931 40%
Queens $7,432,100 $272,852 4%
Staten Island $6,295,700 $134,964 2%
NYC $43,716,400 $8,725,928 20%
Source: OMB Asset investment Management Report, Agency Reconciliation, Fiscal 
Year 2013
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Libraries
New York City is home to 210 public library 
branches. Today, these branch libraries serve 
more New Yorkers than ever before. They have 
evolved from places to check out books to com-
munity-based resource hubs where residents 
turn for workshops, classes and computer access. 
But while the bricks-and-mortar branches are 
increasingly important, a large percentage were 
built in the first half of the 20th century and suf-
fer from a long list of maintenance challenges. 
Indeed, throughout the city, boilers and HVAC 
systems are failing and building exteriors are 
crumbling. 
The city’s three public library systems–
Queens, Brooklyn and New York, which serves 
Manhattan, Staten Island and the Bronx–rely 
heavily on discretionary funds from City Council 
members and borough presidents to address their 
infrastructure needs. When funding does not ar-
rive, capital investment must be deferred. Brook-
lyn, for instance, has accumulated a $271 million 
capital backlog. This includes $86.7 million for 
interior renovations, $81.7 million in building en-
velope repairs (façade, windows and roofs) and 
$57.1 million for building systems (plumbing, 
HVAC, boilers, electric).128
City Health Clinics
The Department of Health and Mental Hy-
giene (DOHMH) operates over 20 health clinics 
throughout the city. These facilities provide im-
munizations, flu shots, testing for sexually trans-
mitted diseases and other preventative care to all 
New Yorkers, regardless of income or immigra-
tion status. Located in neighborhoods plagued by 
poor health, DOHMH clinics also offer vital ser-
vices to residents suffering from heart disease, 
diabetes, asthma, HIV/AIDs and other debilitat-
ing ailments. 
Half of the DOHMH clinics were built prior to 
1950. Maintenance and capital investment have 
been spotty in recent years, allowing these facil-
ities to fall into disrepair. As with all buildings, 
day-to-day custodial work at clinics is closely 
intertwined with their structural health. This is 
particularly true for roofs. ”Because of layoffs we 
don’t have enough staff to check on all the roof 
drains to ensure they’re not clogged,” says Sally 
Yap, executive facilities director. “If you have 
standing water and snow and ice on the roof, that 
roof is not going to last a long time.” 
Elevators at clinics are also an issue. Most 
DOHMH buildings rely on geared traction el-
evators, an obsolete technology that requires 
constant maintenance and is subject to frequent 
breakdowns. When the elevators are not func-
tioning, asthmatic children must be carried up 
Source: OMB Asset Investment Management Report, Agency Reconciliation, Fiscal Year 2013
City Shelters in Need of Repair
Buildings Average  Year Built
Capital Needs 
FY2014-17
External Archi-
tecture
Sum of Dollars 
Committed
Percent 
Funded
Bronx 12 1957 $5,889,000 $2,319,600 $3,486,593 59%
Brooklyn 21 1937 $12,738,300 $4,440,900 $326,491 3%
Manhattan 16 1933 $30,650,300 $16,223,000 $3,714,429 12%
Queens 5 1962 $953,800 $449,900 $210,967 22%
Staten Island 1 1937 $48,700 $0 $0 0%
NYC 55 1943 $50,280,100 $23,433,400 $7,738,480 15%
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stairs and elderly patients are often forced to re-
schedule appointments. Over the last three years, 
9 DOHMH clinics have accumulated 24 active el-
evator violations. Fifteen violations were issued 
in 2013 alone.129
Courthouses 
New York City’s courthouses are old, under-
funded and overtaxed. Entryways in courthouses 
are often too small to accommodate today’s secu-
rity procedures and machinery, leading to severe 
congestion and missed court dates.  Broken eleva-
tors leave courtrooms inaccessible to people with 
disabilities, forcing them to reschedule hearings.  
Throughout the city, aging courthouses are 
chronically underfunded. In the AIMS report, 
the OMB identified $57.7 million dollars of basic 
capital needs, but pledged only $24.6 million for 
Source: OMB Asset Investment Management Report, Agency Reconciliation, Fiscal Year 2013
City Courthouses with the Largest Funding Gaps
Court Built Capital Needs FY2014-17
Dollars
Committed Funding Gap
Manhattan Criminal Courts Building 1938 $10,043,900 $477,908 $9,565,992 
Bronx County Courthouse 1933 $5,541,000 $1,148,788 $4,392,212 
Bronx Hall of Justice 2003 $3,173,800 $0 $3,173,800 
Manhattan Supreme Court 1925 $3,234,500 $573,424 $2,661,076 
Queens Criminal Courts 1961 $3,074,200 $866,501 $2,207,699 
Queens Civil/Housing Court 1997 $2,097,100 $0 $2,097,100 
Source: OMB Asset Investment Management Report, Agency Reconciliation, Fiscal Year 2013
City Courthouses in Need of Repair
Borough Average Year Built
Courts
Surveyed
Capital 
Needs 
FY2014-17
Dollars
Committed Funding Gap
Bronx 1978 4 $19,757,400 $11,714,108 $8,043,292 
Brooklyn 1941 3 $7,647,800 $5,142,016 $2,505,784 
Manhattan 1926 7 $20,886,700 $5,217,697 $15,669,003 
Queens 1955 5 $8,178,600 $2,429,025 $5,749,575 
Staten Island 1927 4 $1,186,900 $112,733 $1,074,167 
Grand Total 1943 23 $57,657,400 $24,615,579 $33,041,821 
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courthouses in its four-year capital commitment 
plan. Manhattan courthouses, the oldest in the 
five boroughs, will experience the largest fund-
ing gap, at $15.7 million, though courthouses in 
the Bronx ($8 million) and Queens ($5.7 million) 
have significant unmet needs as well. 
More than $2 million in capital funding at six 
city courthouses will be deferred over the next 
four years. The Manhattan Criminal Courts Build-
ing will experience a staggering $9.6 million capi-
tal funding gap while unmet needs at the Bronx 
County Courthouse will reach $4.4 million. 
Of the 23 courthouses managed by the De-
partment of Citywide Administrative Services, 16 
have outstanding elevator violations. Five have 
accumulated more than four active violations over 
the last three years: Queens Supreme Court (18), 
Queens Criminal Courts (15), Brooklyn Supreme 
Court (6), Manhattan Criminal Courts Building 
(5) and Midtown Community Court (5). Queens 
courthouses are the worst offenders, collecting 
39 of the city’s 71 open violations.130 Elevators at 
the Supreme Court in Long Island City and the 
Queens Supreme Court rely on antiquated parts 
that are no longer manufactured.
Jails
New York’s jails are old and in need of re-
pairs. The New York City Department of Correc-
tion (DOC) operates 14 jails throughout the city, 
including ten on Rikers Island. The average com-
plex on Rikers Island is 44 years old, while the 
city’s borough detention centers are 47 years old 
on average. 
According to AIMS, DOC will have over $290 
million in state of good repair needs over the next 
four years.131 Eight complexes on Rikers have 
capital needs exceeding $10 million, yet only 
two–Otis Bantum Correction Center and Rose M. 
Singer Center–are slated to receive more than 30 
percent of necessary funding.132
The city’s 14 jail house approximately 12,000 
inmates, most of whom are awaiting sentencing. 
Beginning in 1975, a slew of court cases—col-
lectively known as the Benjamin litigation—found 
conditions at New York City Jails were unconsti-
tutional, and the courts appointed the Office of 
Compliance Consultants to oversee their remedi-
ation. While a number of issues have since been 
addressed, violations concerning fire safety, ven-
tilation and modular housing units remain unre-
solved.133
Source: OMB Asset Investment Management Report, Agency Reconciliation, Fiscal Year 2013
Rikers Island Jails with over $10 million in Repair Needs
Rikers Facility State of GoodRepair Needs
Dollars Committed 
2014-2018
Percent
Funded
Anna M. Kross Center $22,951,400 $216,891 1%
Eric M. Taylor Center $57,495,300 $3,589,889 6%
George Motchan Detention Center $10,708,000 $376,556 4%
James A. Thomas Center $34,544,000 $0 0%
Otis Bantum Correction Center $14,188,900 $11,087,382 78%
Robert N. Davoren Center $60,292,100 $9,832,843 16%
Rose M. Singer Center $12,312,300 $5,201,548 42%
West Facility $12,600,700 $3,504,700 28%
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In 2015, after years of budgetary delays, DOC 
is scheduled to complete the installation of fire 
alarms.134 Though a necessary improvement, 
detection systems are a half measure in correc-
tional settings—locked behind bars, inmates can-
not simply run away when they hear an alarm or 
smell smoke. “Phase I is fire alarms, Phase II is 
everything else: compartmentation, sprinklers, 
entrances and exits,” says John Boston, director 
of the Legal Aid Society’s Prisoners’ Rights Proj-
ect. “DOC has been focusing for some time on fire 
alarms despite our repeated complaints that they 
need to get started on the other aspects of this 
process. They have resisted that.” 
While the Anna M. Kross Center and North 
Infirmary Command at Rikers Island are receiv-
ing broader safety upgrades this year, including 
sprinklers and improved fire smoke compart-
mentation, many other jails lack these systems.
When fires do occur, ventilation systems help 
draw smoke from buildings. They also filter and 
circulate air in everyday, non-emergency situ-
ations. Ventilation equipment in several Rikers 
Island facilities is inadequate, jeopardizing the 
health of inmates, 20 percent of whom suffer 
from asthma.135 During one visit to the Robert N. 
Davoren Center, inspectors discovered ventilation 
ducts had been blocked off with sheet metal. No 
explanation was provided. The replacement and 
reconfiguration of the ductwork has delayed re-
habilitation of the complex by at least two years.136 
  
Hunts Point Market 
The Hunts Point Food Distribution Center is 
the second largest wholesale market in the world. 
Its meat, fish and produce markets generate more 
than $3 billion in annual sales, host 125 mer-
chants and employ 6,050 people.
While the Hunts Point Fish Market is rela-
tively new, its meat and produce counterparts are 
hobbled by undersized and outdated facilities. 
Refrigeration capacity is inadequate, and loading 
docks were not designed for today’s 53-foot trac-
tor trailers. Despite commercial success, Hunts 
Point’s market share is in jeopardy. If it is not 
modernized immediately, markets in New Jersey 
and Pennsylvania will continue to poach business 
and jobs.   
The Hunts Point Meat Market, built in 1973, 
contains approximately 1,000,000 square feet of 
refrigeration and freezer space. Most warehouses 
have 13-foot ceilings, tall enough to accommo-
date just one or two pallets of goods. According to 
Bruce Reingold, general manager of the Coopera-
tive Meat Market, the ideal ceiling would be three 
times higher and accommodate the stacking of 
five pallets. To compensate for this deficit, com-
panies must improvise, storing products in refrig-
erated containers on diesel trucks. Idling trucks 
are strewn across the grounds, exacerbating con-
gestion and aggravating air quality in the South 
Bronx, where rates of asthma are the highest in 
the country. 
Conditions are similar at the 50-year-old 
Hunts Point Produce Market. While modern 
warehouses customize temperatures to individu-
al products, the Produce Market offers only one 
temperature setting and lacks a backup genera-
tor.137 The market struggles to maintain a steady 
temperature throughout storage and distribution. 
Loading docks, for instance, are unsealed and un-
refrigerated, degrading food quality and leading 
to spoilage and waste.138 The docks are also un-
dersized for modern tractor-trailers, delaying the 
packing and unpacking of inventory and compli-
cating inspections. 
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In a city where it costs an estimated $52 million to 
restore the New York State Pavilion from the 1964 
World’s Fair and $150 million to renovate the New 
York Aquarium, it’s hard to fathom, much less cal-
culate, the full cost of addressing the infrastruc-
ture vulnerabilities laid out in this report. Draw-
ing from our analysis of agency and authority 
capital budgets and asset condition assessments, 
however, we estimate that at least $47.3 billion is 
needed to bring the city’s core infrastructure to a 
state of good repair. 
Every year, the city Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) updates its Asset Investments 
Management System (AIMS), surveying facilities 
and infrastructure that are managed by many—
but by no means all—of the city’s agencies. Based 
on the most recent AIMS assessment, the city 
projects that it will cost $6.3 billion139 from fiscal 
year 2014 to 2017 to maintain the safety and func-
tionality of existing assets under management at 
18 city agencies. This includes $3.2 billion for the 
Department of Transportation, $1.3 billion at the 
Department of Education, $471 million for the 
Parks Department, $282 million at the Health and 
Hospitals Corp., $109 million at the Department 
of Sanitation and $85 million at the Department 
of Cultural Affairs. 
While these numbers are large, they signifi-
cantly underestimate true capital needs. Not only 
are water and sewage assets, East River bridges 
and agency vehicles excluded, but the inspections 
themselves are incomplete. For instance, the AIMS 
assessment calculated the cost of rehabilitating 
six City University of New York (CUNY) commu-
nity colleges140 at $66 million, but a more rigorous 
assessment commissioned by CUNY itself put the 
capital backlog at $731 million, 11 times greater. 
State of Good Repair needs are even more 
significant in the agencies and authorities not in-
cluded in AIMS. The New York City Transit divi-
sion of the MTA would need to invest $16.3 billion 
from 2015 to 2019 to maintain the full functional-
ity of its assets, according to its recently published 
Twenty Year Capital Needs Assessment: 2015-2034.141 
New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) de-
velopments need $15.5 billion over the next five 
years to fully rehabilitate the building stock.142 
Over this same five-year period, the Port Authori-
ty estimates that it would cost approximately $6.8 
billion to bring its bridges, tunnels, trains, airports 
and buildings in the metropolitan region into a 
state of good repair.143 Finally, CUNY itemized 
$2.5 billion in immediate capital needs at 20 of its 
senior colleges and community colleges.144
It is important to note that these estimates 
only consider the maintenance and replacement 
of existing assets. They do not include creating 
new capacity and making programmatic changes 
in a facility, such as converting a classroom to a 
computer room or a gym to a cafeteria.  When a 
new playground costs $2.5 million, a new library 
$15 to $20 million, and a mile of subway line $1.6 
billion, total capital needs in New York City quick-
ly escalate beyond the $47.3 billion state of good 
repair figure.
While all this adds up to roughly $50 billion, 
the city agencies and government authorities in 
charge of these assets have thus far only received 
a fraction of this amount in capital funding. Of the 
$6.3 billion outlined in the AIMS report, just $3 
billion has been committed. At the Department of 
Education, only $224 million (17 percent) of the 
estimated $1.3 billion line-item state of good re-
pair needs have been funded, leaving a $1.1 bil-
lion gap. At the Department of Correction, only 
$45 million (15 percent) of the estimated capital 
needs of $293 million has been funded, leaving a 
$247 million gap. At the Parks Department, only 
$81 million (17 percent) of the estimated capital 
CAPITAL CRUNCH
Bringing New York City’s infrastructure into a state of good repair will cost tens of billions of dollars 
in public investment, but thus far only a fraction of this amount has been committed 
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needs of $471 million has been funded, leaving a 
$390 million gap.
The Housing Authority, Port Authority, MTA 
and CUNY will face similar funding gaps as well. 
The Port Authority will not meet $6.2 billion 
of state of good repair needs over its 2011-2020 
capital budget cycle.147 New York City Transit ac-
cumulated a $10.5 billion capital backlog over the 
course of its 2010-2014 budget. NYCHA’s capi-
tal funding gap will reach $14 billion by 2016.148 
CUNY senior and community colleges are cur-
rently contending with $2.5 billion in deferred 
capital maintenance.149 The Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection, responsible for managing 
the city’s water and sewage systems, has never 
released a publicly available unconstrained capi-
tal needs assessment, but their backlog is surely 
several billions of dollars.
Given the scope and age of New York City’s 
infrastructure, these funding gaps are as inevi-
table as they are troubling. To his credit, Mayor 
Michael Bloomberg did make significant progress 
in funding the city’s infrastructure needs. From 
fiscal year 2003 to 2014, more capital dollars were 
invested than in the 17 years prior. Adjusting for 
inflation, Bloomberg devoted $9.1 billion annu-
ally compared to Rudolph Giuliani’s $6.8 billion, 
David Dinkins’ $6.5 billion and, in his final term 
in office, Ed Koch’s $5.7 billion. 
But while the Bloomberg administration de-
voted significant sums to new schools, parks and 
major projects like the third water tunnel and the 
7 train extension, state of good repair needs actu-
ally increased during his tenure. According to the 
AIMS, capital needs increased from $4.6 billion in 
2002 to $6.3 billion today. While state of good re-
pair spending also grew, it was not enough to keep 
pace with increasing needs.150
Sources: Independent Budget Office, “Agency Capital Expenditures By Purpose” for 1987-2013; The City of New York, “Capital Commitment Plan, Fiscal Year 
2014” for 2014
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Estimated Capital Needs and Funding Gap at 18 City Agencies
Agency Capital Needs FY2014-17 Dollars Committed Funding Gap
Department of Education $1,316,169,000 $224,484,914145 $1,091,684,086 
Department of Transportation $3,192,417,000 $2,402,590,000 $789,827,000 
Dept. of Parks and Recreation $471,151,000 $81,225,000 $389,926,000 
Department of Correction $292,502,000 $45,151,000 $247,351,000 
Dept. of Small Business Services146 $229,592,000 $13,623,000 $215,969,000 
Health and Hospitals Corporation $282,014,000 $97,329,000 $184,685,000 
Department of Sanitation $109,867,000 $20,296,000 $89,571,000 
Dept. of Citywide Admin. Services $129,929,000 $40,550,000 $89,379,000 
Department of Cultural Affairs $85,267,000 $25,212,000 $60,055,000 
Department of Homeless Services $50,280,000 $7,738,000 $42,542,000 
Police Department $59,708,000 $24,500,000 $35,208,000 
Fire Department $18,585,000 $3,337,000 $15,248,000 
Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene $17,138,000 $2,771,000 $14,367,000 
Human Resources Administration $9,145,000 $1,436,000 $7,709,000 
Department for the Aging $1,528,000 $292,000 $1,236,000 
Division of Youth & Family Justice $1,117,000  -   $1,117,000 
Admin. for Children's Services $1,053,000  -   $1,053,000 
Taxi & Limousine Commission $1,289,000 $1,289,000  -   
Total $6,268,751,000 $2,991,823,914 $3,276,927,086 
Source: OMB Asset Investment Management Report, Agency Reconciliation, Fiscal Year 2013
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Federal Airport Improvement Program Grants, Inflation Adjusted
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FIXING THE FOUNDATION
Declining levels of federal infrastructure funding, exorbitant construction costs and limited capital 
planning have magnified New York’s infrastructure challenges 
A number of factors have made it difficult for New 
York City government officials to make a signifi-
cant dent in repairing and modernizing its aging 
infrastructure. Most importantly, the federal gov-
ernment has failed to commit sufficient funds for 
New York and other older cities to address their 
infrastructure needs, and in recent years has even 
reduced the capital dollars it sends to New York. 
Furthermore, given its high construction costs, 
the money New York does have for capital spend-
ing does not go very far. In addition, the city argu-
ably does not have enough sources of dedicated 
revenue for infrastructure—and in recent years, 
policymakers have allowed some of its dedicated 
revenues to be used for other purposes. Finally, 
the city has not done a great job of planning and 
prioritizing infrastructure projects.  
State and Federal Retrenchment
As infrastructure needs grew over the last de-
cade, federal, state and private grants declined, 
now covering only one-quarter of the city’s capi-
tal budget. In recent decades, Washington has re-
treated from its municipal infrastructure commit-
ments. The federal government funded 78 percent 
of the New York City Transit’s 1975-1978 capital 
budget, but only 25 percent of the MTA budget for 
2010-11.151 It sent $267 million (inflation adjust-
ed) in sewage and drinking water grants to New 
York State in 2000, but only $203 million in 2013. 
It contributed $420 million to NYCHA’s capital 
budget in 2001, but only $256 million in 2013.152 
Meanwhile, the state has also reduced its funding 
for NYCHA and has not fulfilled its capital com-
Source: FAA, “Airport Improvement Program (AIP) Grant Histories,” 2002-2013
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mitments to City schools mandated in the Cam-
paign for Fiscal Equity litigation.153
The city’s airports have been hit especially 
hard by federal divestment. The Federal Aviation 
Administration provided $101 million in Airport 
Improvement Grants to JFK and LaGuardia in 
2003, but only $17 million in 2013.154
Construction Costs
It is more expensive to build in New York 
City than anywhere else in the nation. Accord-
ing to the Rider-Levett-Bucknall Comparative 
Cost Index,155 construction is nearly 70 percent 
more costly in the city than in Las Vegas, Denver 
or Phoenix. Even its closest rival, Honolulu, is 9 
percent cheaper.
Not only is New York expensive, it has grown 
increasingly more so. From 1990 to 2000, the cost 
of construction held steady, closely tracking infla-
tion. Since the turn of the century, however, these 
figures have diverged. According to the Engineer-
ing News-Record’s Building Cost Index, construc-
tion expenses have outpaced inflation by 13 per-
cent since 2000, 53 percent versus 40 percent. As 
the real cost of construction rises, the city’s capi-
tal dollars buy less and less. 
While these high and escalating construc-
tion costs are, in part, inherent to New York City’s 
age, density and dynamism, a number of regula-
tory impediments contribute. The city’s procure-
ment and construction laws remain subordinate 
to the state, severely constraining innovation 
and contributing to cost overruns. Public works 
projects can only be contracted via a design-bid-
build methodology, where the lowest bidder must 
be awarded the contract, with little emphasis on 
their qualifications. According to several people 
interviewed for this report, design-bid-build en-
forces an arbitrary and injurious separation be-
tween the design, construction and maintenance 
of an infrastructure project, effectively preclud-
ing life-cycle considerations. Because drawings 
are finalized prior to consulting the builder, their 
“constructability” is not assessed as it would be 
in a joint Design-Build contract. Once building 
begins, the design will often need modification, 
necessitating time consuming and expensive 
“change orders.” The rigid separation of design-
ing and building discourages and complicates 
the use of on-time and on-budget incentives and 
penalties in city contracts because it is difficult 
to apportion liability between the contractor, the 
designer or the city agency that scoped the proj-
ect. Joint Design-Build contracts are more condu-
cive to these important clauses. Additionally, the 
costs of operating new infrastructure cannot be 
considered in design-bid-build contracts, even if 
a more expensive bid uses high-quality materi-
als that last longer and are cheaper to maintain. 
Were New York City authorized to issue Design-
Build-Operate-Maintain contracts, appropriate 
emphasis could be placed on life-cycle outcomes. 
This would open the door for long-term public-
private partnerships.
In recent years, Albany has made a cautious 
effort to reform their antiquated procurement 
laws. A 2011 bill authorized a handful of state 
agencies to pursue Design-Build contracts, but it 
excluded municipalities. It is set to expire at the 
Federal Capital Funding for 
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end of 2014.156 Were the state to renew the legis-
lation, expand its scope beyond horizontal infra-
structure, authorize both Design-Build and De-
sign-Build-Operate-Maintain contracts, and allow 
municipalities to participate, New York City’s pro-
curement process and the long-term quality of its 
infrastructure would be significantly improved.
In 2008, Albany granted local governments the 
right to issue Project Labor Agreements (PLAs) in 
lieu of Wicks Law, a cumbersome regulation re-
quiring agencies to issue separate contracts for 
plumbing, electric and HVAC on any construc-
tion project exceeding $3 million. New York City’s 
PLAs will expire on June 30, 2014.
The 2008 Wicks reform included a provision 
authorizing local governments to pre-qualify 
public works contractors based on credentials, 
experience and past performance, thus ensuring 
that selected contractors are capable of providing 
quality construction.157 While the Department of 
Design and Construction, Department of Housing, 
Preservation and Development and Department 
of Information, Technology and Telecommunica-
tions have begun to experiment with pre-quali-
fication, thus far, the emphasis appears to be on 
reducing the length of the procurement process. 
Many of those we interviewed for this report be-
lieve that pre-qualification should be used more 
aggressively for complex projects to screen out 
unqualified candidates incapable of honoring 
their “low bid” and to create a readily available 
pool of competent vendors. 
Under New York City’s current procurement 
rules, all contracts over $25,000 must receive ap-
proval from the OMB, the Law Department, May-
or’s Office of Contract Services and numerous 
other agencies. The procurement cycle lasts 162 
days on average,158 with more complex contracts 
taking as long as two years.  “It kills a lot of the ef-
ficiency when every small contract jumps through 
the same hoops as a $100 million contract,” says 
former Parks Commissioner Adrian Benepe. “Peo-
ple say agencies can’t get anything built, but it’s 
because the system is built-in with inefficiencies.” 
The city environmental impact assessments 
also lead to costly delays as well as inflated le-
gal fees. The City Environmental Quality Review 
requires that “environmental, social and eco-
nomic factors be considered before governmen-
tal approval is given to proposed activities that 
may significantly affect our urban environment.” 
While agencies at the state-level adhere to strict 
timetables for environmental assessments, the 
city does not set time limits for their preparation 
or review. A typical environmental review in the 
city can take six months to complete and cost be-
Sources: BLS, “Consumer Price Index New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, 2004-2014”; Engineering News-Record, City Cost Index - New York, 2000-
2013
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tween $100,000 for smaller projects and $2.5 mil-
lion for larger ones.159
Given the extensive environmental review 
and procurement process, one might expect that 
city construction projects are accurately scoped, 
planned and budgeted prior to their authoriza-
tion. But while a recent pilot program that in-
creased funding for preliminary project scoping 
has paid dividends, problems remain. Thirty-one 
percent of school capital improvement projects, 
30 percent of structural work on bridges and 12 to 
17 percent of construction projects performed by 
DDC run behind schedule. At DEP, large projects 
have experienced tremendous cost overruns. The 
Catskill-Delaware Water Ultraviolet Disinfec-
tion Facility, completed in October 2013 at a cost 
of $1.6 billion, was four years late and $1 billion 
over budget. The Croton Water Filtration Plant, 
slated for completion in 2012, is currently two 
years overdue and $2 billion over budget.160
These overruns are hardly exclusive to city 
agencies. As of 2012, the MTA Capital Construc-
tion Company was $5.5 billion over-budget on 
five of its recent “megaprojects”: South Ferry 
Terminal, Fulton Street Transit Center, Flushing 
Line Extension, Second Avenue Subway and East 
Side Access. Both East Side Access and the Fulton 
Street Transit Center are at least five years be-
hind schedule.161
Dedicated Revenues
As Washington and Albany withdraw from 
their infrastructure commitments, it becomes in-
creasingly important to establish generous, se-
cure and stable funding sources for maintaining 
New York’s critical assets. Unfortunately, the city 
and state have developed few dedicated revenue 
sources in recent years and have diverted money 
from those already in place. Moving forward, New 
York can learn from other cities (and past mis-
steps) to create dual purpose tolls and fees that 
simultaneously discourage the overuse of exist-
ing infrastructure and provide dedicated funding 
to maintain and expand these facilities.
In Seattle and Philadelphia, Stormwater Man-
agement Fees not only provide funding to the wa-
ter and sewer system, they also encourages resi-
dent to reduce the amount of rainwater entering 
the sewer system from their property. Customers 
are billed based on the percentage of their lot 
that is permeable, thus absorbing rainwater. The 
more green elements—such as grass, gardens, 
green roofs and permeable concrete—the lower 
the fee.163
Source: Citizens Budget Commission, “A Better Way to Pay for the MTA,” October 2012
MTA “Megaproject” Cost and Completion Schedules
Original Project Current Projection
Project Estimated Cost(in millions)
Completion 
Schedule
Estimated Cost
(in millions)
Completion 
Schedule
South Ferry Terminal $420 April 2009 $541 February 2011
Fulton Street Transit Center $750 July 2009 $1,400 June 2014
Flushing Line Extension $1,900 June 2013 $2,153 June 2014
Second Avenue Subway $3,800 June 2014 $4,500 December 2016
East Side Access162 $6,300 August 2014 $10,000 2021
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The congestion fee, which was approved by 
the City Council but defeated in Albany, offers 
another example of a fee that both generates new 
revenue and incentivizes more optimal use of 
city assets. Bridges without tolls attract a dispro-
portionate share of truck and cars, causing con-
gestion on bridges and local roads that lack the 
structural capacity to handle the weight. Tolling 
the East River bridges, for instance, could extend 
their useful life, improve traffic flow and create a 
dedicated revenue stream for public transporta-
tion.
The leasing of city property could also gen-
erate revenue while addressing infrastructure 
deficits. In densely populated cities, telecom com-
panies favor “small cell technology,” opting to put 
cell sites close to street level rather than building 
macro towers on top of buildings. Companies like 
Verizon are considering all available locations, 
including city-owned payphones, streetlights and 
traffic lights. Leasing such spaces to these pro-
viders would give the city a new revenue stream 
while improving cell service and mobile broad-
band. The fee could potentially be used to fund 
the Economic Development Corp’s ConnectNYC 
program, which provides fiber internet connec-
tivity in commercial districts.
As the city considers new dedicated fund-
ing streams, it must also work to protect existing 
ones. At the MTA, $20 million from the Metropol-
itan Mass Transportation Operating Assistance 
account was transferred to the state’s General 
Debt Service Fund in 2013. Another $40 million 
transfer has been proposed for 2014.164 Funds 
from the Dedicated Highway and Bridge Trust 
Fund have also been used to cover state budget 
costs.165 A recent toll cut at the Verrazano-Nar-
rows Bridge, announced in February, will cut $7 
million in toll revenue from the state budget and 
$7 million from the MTA budget.166 In New York 
City, revenue dedicated to the water and sewage 
system is redirected to the city’s expense budget 
through “rental payments.” While these payments 
were established to pay off water-related bonds 
that preceded the 1985 creation of the Munici-
pal Water Financial Authority, that provision was 
tweaked in 2005 so that they are no longer con-
nected to prior debt service.167 Since 2005, rental 
payments have increased significantly, from $109 
million to $208 million.168
BORROWING TO BUILD
To finance capital projects, New York, like other cities around the country, relies primarily on 
borrowing. From FY2002 to FY 2013, total outstanding debt rose from $42.1 billion to $67.6 billion174 
and annual debt service levels increased from $3.9 billion to $5.8 billion.175
While the city’s debt has increased, there is ample evidence that its financial position has improved 
since the turn of the century. As a percentage of total city revenue, outstanding debt actually fell during 
the Bloomberg administration, from 158 percent in FY2002 to 135 percent in FY2013.176 
These figures exclude Water Authority debt, which finances the capital needs of the city’s water 
and sewer system. Over the last decade, massive Department of Environmental Protection projects—
including the 3rd Water Tunnel ($4.7 billion), an upgrade to the Newton Creek Wastewater Treatment 
Plant ($5 billion), the Delaware/Catskill Ultraviolet Disinfection Facility ($1.6 billion) and the Croton 
Filtration Plant ($3.2 billion)177—were financed by a rapid increase in borrowing, from $11.2 billion in 
FY2002 to $29.3 billion in FY2013.178 To cover their growing debt, sewage and water fees have risen 124 
percent over the last decade.
The MTA also has grown increasingly reliant on borrowing to finance its state of good repair needs 
as well as its ambitious expansion projects. From 2000 to 2011, the MTA’s outstanding debt increased 
from $14 billion to $32 billion, and its annual debt service increased from $1 billion to nearly $2.2 
billion.179
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The city’s airports also have been affected by 
local politics, as well as the financial difficulties 
of many airlines. While the airports generate sig-
nificant revenues from landing fees, gate fees and 
other levies, $214 million at JFK was diverted to 
non-airport related activities between 2004 and 
2010.169 Federal regulations require airport op-
erators to reinvest all airport revenue into their 
facilities, but the Port Authority received an ex-
ception. Area politicians in several cases have 
pushed the Port Authority to use money gener-
ated by the airports to prevent toll and fare in-
creases at other Port Authority-managed projects, 
such as the PATH train.   
Capital Planning 
Given the breadth and variety of New York 
capital assets and its vast inventory of needs, it 
is critical that the city’s scarce capital dollars are 
appropriated intelligently. Yet many of those we 
interviewed say that the city does not have an 
adequate process for documenting infrastructure 
needs and prioritizing investment. 
The AIMS report published by the city’s Office 
of Management and Budget provides some of this 
analysis, but it does not cover a large portion of 
critical infrastructure, including everything under 
the purview of the DEP, and inspections are often 
cursory.
Sam Schwartz, an early advocate for the AIMS 
report, says it has never been as effective as in-
tended. “Back in the 1980s, bridges were rotting, 
water mains were breaking, sewers were collaps-
ing. At that point, we needed to honestly report 
on our infrastructure. There was a charter revi-
sion in 1988 to require this reporting,” he says. “At 
the time, I screamed ‘Don’t let it be OMB that re-
ports on it! They will just make up something that 
makes everything sound okay.’ Low and behold, it 
became a useless document with too many pages,” 
he says 
As the Mayor’s Office of Data Analytics has 
demonstrated, high quality and accessible data is 
critical to improving city operations and planning. 
During its short tenure, MODA has made several 
contributions to infrastructure maintenance, such 
as helping DEP prevent sewer backups and pin-
pointing old buildings vulnerable to catastrophic 
fires. This kind of statistical analysis could be ap-
plied to infrastructure planning, to optimize re-
placement cycles, maintenance staffing and user 
fees.  
Currently, some existing planning tools have 
been underutilized. One is the Environmental 
Impact Assessment. When a planned develop-
ment is found to have a significant impact on in-
frastructure—such as increased demand on roads, 
subways, schools, sewage plants or the electric 
grid—the developer is required to propose “miti-
gations” that must be approved by the responsible 
city agency.170 While this analysis was meant to 
aid infrastructure planning, there is no method to 
ensure that mitigations are implemented.
The Department of City Planning has played 
only a limited role in capital planning in recent 
years. The quadrennial Zoning and Planning Re-
port—establishing planning policy in conjunction 
with the “ten-year capital strategy [and] the four-
year capital program”171—was released only once 
since 1989 and eliminated in 2012.172 The Annual 
Report on Social Indicators, which details demo-
graphic, environmental and infrastructure condi-
tions and trends and proposes plans to respond to 
them, has not been prepared since 2005. This lack 
of reporting is particularly notable because it took 
place at a time when, as a recent City Council In-
frastructure task force documented: “The city has 
gone through a decade or more of aggressive de-
velopment that has exacerbated its infrastructure 
maintenance problems and created an intense 
demand for additional infrastructure.” 173
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Though New York’s essential infrastructure has 
improved over the past 25 years, a look under the 
hood reveals a number of critical vulnerabilities. 
From structurally deficient bridges and deterio-
rating roads to leaking water pipes, antiquated 
airport terminals, decaying school buildings and 
fraying copper telecom wires, too much of New 
York’s infrastructure is unworthy of a growing 
and global city facing increased competition for 
talented workers and business investment. 
To be sure, we do not expect New York poli-
cymakers to address every one of the city’s infra-
structure vulnerabilities at this time. Policymakers 
will need to prioritize. But if a significant chunk of 
the city’s critical infrastructure is not brought to 
a state of good repair in the years ahead, it could 
seriously undermine the city’s economic competi-
tiveness and quality of life—and lead to substan-
tial long-term costs. 
In the pages that follow, we lay out more than a 
dozen recommendations for city and state policy-
makers to address these challenges. Our ideas fall 
into four key areas: 1) Increasing Infrastructure 
Investments; 2) Bringing Down Infrastructure 
Costs; 3) Improving Infrastructure Planning; and 
4) Developing New Infrastructure Innovations.
Increasing Infrastructure Investments
Make investing in NYC’s aging infrastructure a 
key part of the de Blasio administration’s plans 
to create middle-income jobs
With 35 percent of working adults in New 
York City in “low-wage jobs” and nearly one in 
ten working New Yorkers earning too little to of-
ficially climb above the federal poverty line, it’s 
refreshing that Mayor Bill de Blasio is looking 
to develop new strategies for creating middle-
income jobs. The de Blasio administration should 
consider a sizable public works program. It’s hard 
to think of any other city action that could gener-
ate more blue-collar jobs than an increased and 
sustained investment in repairing the city’s aging 
infrastructure. Such a program could include new 
apprenticeship programs and job training to en-
sure that a diverse mix of New Yorkers can access 
these jobs and build long-term skills in the con-
struction trades. 
Refocus capital spending on state of good repair 
needs
During the 12 years of the Bloomberg admin-
istration, city infrastructure investment reached 
new highs but the overwhelming focus was on 
expanding capacity—developing new parks, 
schools, water infrastructure, subway extensions, 
etc.—rather than on repairing aging assets. It’s 
now time to focus on preserving existing infra-
structure. The de Blasio administration should 
devote a larger share of the capital budget to state 
of good repair work and favor new infrastructure 
projects that explicitly relieve overburdened as-
sets, thus extending their useful life.180 
Identify new dedicated revenue sources to pay 
for infrastructure projects—and stop divert-
ing money from existing “dedicated” funding 
streams
To finance the city’s growing state of good 
repair needs, the city must develop new dedicat-
ed revenue sources. For example, the New York 
Building Congress has suggested the city imple-
ment a residential parking permit program, with 
the revenues going to transportation infrastruc-
ture projects. Another possibility is environmen-
tally sound Waste to Energy facilities which, ac-
cording to the Building Congress and the Citizens 
Budget Commission, would reduce waste disposal 
costs and create a potential revenue stream to 
support the city’s sanitation operations. But poli-
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cymakers should look to identify other opportu-
nities. In the years ahead, if the state ultimately 
decides to legalize fracking, it should consider 
dedicating a share of the potentially lucrative new 
tax revenues for infrastructure projects. 
In addition, city and state officials should re-
frain from diverting or dipping into the already-
insufficient dedicated revenue streams, a practice 
that has been all-too-common in recent years.  
Implement East River tolls or congestion fees 
City and state policymakers should get behind 
plans to establish a fairer bridge toll system to re-
duce vehicle congestion in the city’s central busi-
ness districts and create a needed mechanism for 
funding transit infrastructure projects. Though 
prior efforts to impose tolls on the East River 
bridges—including Bloomberg’s congestion pric-
ing initiative—were dead on arrival in the state 
legislature, there are indications that newly de-
signed bridge tolling proposals could gain broad-
er support. For instance, while Sam Schwartz’s 
“Fair Plan” would add new tolls on the East River 
bridges that bring vehicles into the central busi-
ness district, it would sharply reduce tolls on 
bridges that don’t enter the Manhattan’s business 
district. Most importantly, Schwartz’s plan would 
result in $1.2 billion annually for transit projects 
and regional highway improvements. At a time 
when transit ridership is at record levels but the 
MTA’s precarious finances have left the authority 
without funds to maintain and improve the sys-
tem, Mayor de Blasio, Governor Cuomo and other 
city and state policymakers must throw their full 
support behind this—or some alternative—bridge 
tolling plan. 
Introduce a Surface Water Management Fee to 
incentivize capture of rainwater before it enters 
sewers
To address the roughly 27 billion gallons of 
raw sewage and polluted stormwater that enter 
local waterways each year, the city has increased 
the number of green elements in New York City 
streets and parks, absorbing rainwater before it 
enters the sewer system. To incentivize similar 
rainwater capture on private property, the DEP 
should consider introducing a Surface Water Man-
agement Fee. Customers would be billed based on 
the percentage of their lot featuring impervious 
surfaces. The more green elements added—such 
as grass, gardens, green roofs and permeable con-
crete—the lower the fee. 
Over 500 utilities currently apply stormwater 
charges, including Philadelphia, Washington DC, 
and Seattle. Sophisticated Geographical Informa-
tion Systems (GIS) programs enable these utili-
ties to track impervious surface area in order to 
maintain accurate assessments. This new revenue 
source could be coupled with a credit program to 
help customers finance the installation of green 
elements on their property; repaid each month 
via the utility bill.
Create new mechanisms to capture value from 
infrastructure projects
Over the past 15 years, much of the public in-
vestment in new parks, transit, schools and other 
infrastructure across the five boroughs has led 
to significant increases in nearby property val-
ues. But as Chris Ward, former executive direc-
tor of the Port Authority, laments, “We’ve lacked 
the capacity to capture that wealth” to help un-
derwrite the cost of those public investments. One 
example is the development of the Hudson River 
Park, where hundreds of millions of dollars of in-
vestment by city and state agencies has sparked 
a wave of new housing and commercial develop-
ment in the surrounding blocks, creating financial 
windfalls for the property owners. City officials 
should consider ways that those benefitting most 
from the improvements could contribute to their 
financing. 
In London, for instance, the Community Infra-
structure Levy helped finance major infrastruc-
ture improvements, including the city’s ambitious 
Crossrail, a new commuter rail line connecting the 
suburbs to central London. Surrounding neigh-
borhoods were assigned to one of three zones, 
depending on their proximity to the new line. In 
areas that are closest to the new rail line, new de-
velopment is taxed at £50 per square meter. In the 
next two zones, the levy falls to £35 per square 
meter and £20 per square meter. 
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New York City could introduce a similar mech-
anism for residential construction around new 
parks, bus rapid transit, subway lines and any 
other infrastructure that bolsters real estate val-
ues. The city has experimented with forms of val-
ue capture at Hudson Yards and Brooklyn Bridge 
Park. London’s Community Infrastructure Levy 
offers a more systematic and ambitious model. 
More federal support
While America’s global competitors  invest in 
new airports, transit systems, schools, telecom-
munications networks, smart energy grids and 
highways, the United States government is pro-
viding less and less infrastructure funding to 
America’s most important global city. This needs 
to change. New York and other cities simply do 
not have the resources to tackle their aging in-
frastructure alone. In his 2014 State of the Union 
address, President Barack Obama urged Congress 
to provide ample revenues for “rebuilding our 
roads, upgrading our ports, unclogging our com-
mutes.” Then, in February 2014, President Obama 
proposed a $302 billion dollar transportation 
spending package to address the nation’s deterio-
rating infrastructure. Congress should embrace 
the challenge and develop a bipartisan frame-
work to significantly increase resources for fix-
ing and modernizing the nation’s infrastructure. 
Such a plan should help cities and states repair 
the oldest bridges, highways, airports and schools; 
upgrade public housing that was built by the fed-
eral government but is now rapidly deteriorat-
ing; and modernize transit infrastructure in cit-
ies where ridership levels are growing rapidly. It 
should consider competitive grants that empower 
cities to come up with innovative infrastructure 
solutions. Mayor de Blasio should team up with 
other mayors, business leaders and labor officials 
to put urban infrastructure needs on the national 
agenda and lobby Congress to fund a meaningful 
investment. 
A lift from Albany
Governor Cuomo made infrastructure invest-
ment a key part of his 2014 State of the State 
speech, noting, “We have to rebuild our infrastruc-
ture because we need a 21st century infrastruc-
ture to build on.” The governor proposed major 
state investment to modernize JFK and LaGuar-
dia airports and build new Metro North stations 
in parts of the Bronx that are underserved by the 
subway system. He called for a referendum that, 
if passed by voters, would provide $2 billion to 
upgrade the technology infrastructure in schools 
across the state. This is a very important start, but 
the state must do far more to support New York 
City’s infrastructure needs. 
Given that New York City is the state’s eco-
nomic engine, the governor and legislature have 
a responsibility to help modernize its aging in-
frastructure. Albany leaders can start by upping 
its investments in New York City highways that 
are managed by the state Department of Trans-
portation and which have seen declining levels of 
maintenance in recent years. It should also pro-
vide more stable support for the Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority’s (MTA’s) capital plan 
and honor its capital commitments to City schools 
mandated in the Campaign for Fiscal Equity liti-
gation. Beyond this, Governor Cuomo and the 
legislature should introduce a much larger pack-
age to modernize bridges, roads, transit systems, 
schools and energy infrastructure from Brooklyn 
to Buffalo. 
Officials in Albany could follow the lead of 
several other states that recently developed inno-
vative approaches to funding infrastructure. For 
instance, Pennsylvania legislators recently ap-
proved a package of tax and fee changes that will 
raise $2.3 billion a year for transportation infra-
structure. Maryland raised the gas tax for the first 
time in 20 years, passed a measure to index the 
tax to keep pace with inflation and levied a new 
sales tax on gasoline—all of which will enable the 
state to pump $4.4 billion into transportation in-
frastructure projects over the next six years. In 
Massachusetts, the legislature approved a trans-
portation infrastructure financing bill that in-
cludes a three-cent per gallon hike in the gasoline 
tax and a $1 per pack cigarette tax increase. All 
together it will provide up to $800 million in new 
annual revenue for transportation by 2018. And 
in January 2014, the state’s governor proposed an 
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additional $12.4 billion package to modernize the 
state’s infrastructure by pumping billions of dol-
lars into transportation. 
Stop diverting airport revenue
JFK and LaGuardia airports both require sig-
nificant infrastructure investments, yet hundreds 
of millions of dollars in revenues generated by 
these airports have been diverted to other Port 
Authority assets, such as the PATH train system. 
Federal regulations require airport operators to 
reinvest all revenue into their facilities to prevent 
cities from irresponsibly using their airports as 
a “cash cow.” The Port Authority is the only ma-
jor airport operator in the nation that has been 
granted an exception to this mandate. With the 
city’s airports in need of significant new invest-
ment, de Blasio and other city and state policy-
makers should push the Port Authority to end this 
practice—or commit to a ceiling on how much can 
be diverted from each airport—and reinvest funds 
into the modernization of JFK and LaGuardia. 
Create an infrastructure bank to help select and 
finance projects with high strategic and eco-
nomic potential
When structured appropriately, and provided 
sufficient resources, government infrastructure 
banks can be an effective way to stretch funding 
while continually targeting new needs. Effective 
banks like California’s Infrastructure and Eco-
nomic Development Bank (I-Bank) are able to 
make their initial capitalizations go much further 
in terms of loans by securitizing bonds with loan 
repayments; the I-Bank, for instance, started out 
with approximately $180 million in 1999 and has 
since made over $400 million in loans to a wide 
variety of agencies, authorities and nonprofits.181 
But rather than using the bank to finance projects 
chosen by other entities—whether an agency or 
elected official—California’s I-Bank uses a com-
petitive application process to select only those 
projects with an economic return. As Chicago’s 
relatively new Infrastructure Trust demonstrates, 
this model could also help the city or state tap into 
private funding sources. Chicago’s Infrastructure 
Trust has so far raised $1.7 billion in funding 
from Citibank, JP Morgan and other banks, and 
as with the I-Bank, loans are to be repaid through 
revenue generating and cost savings opportuni-
ties. As we demonstrate in this report, New York 
has no shortage of such projects: Building retro-
fits at NYCHA and the city’s libraries could gener-
ate significant energy savings, for example, while 
an expansion of fiber in the city’s former manu-
facturing areas, where tech start-ups are often 
stymied by poor broadband service, would create 
a clear source of new revenue.
Bringing Down Infrastructure Costs
Authorize Design-Build and public-private 
partnerships
In 2011, at Governor Cuomo’s initiative, the 
legislature authorized a handful of state agencies 
to pursue Design-Build contracts, but excluded 
municipalities. The law is set to expire at the end 
of 2014. Given the results to date, including the 
positive impact this approach had on the project-
ed cost of replacing the Tappan Zee Bridge and 
in expediting the reconstruction of major upstate 
roads severely damaged by Hurricane Irene, the 
state should renew the legislation, but also ex-
pand its scope beyond horizontal infrastructure 
(such as roads and bridges), authorize both De-
sign-Build and Design-Build-Operate-Maintain 
contracts and allow municipalities to participate. 
Streamlined procurement could reduce costs and 
shorten delivery time frames. New York City’s pro-
curement process and the long-term quality of its 
infrastructure would be significantly improved.
Avoid “Low Bids” from unqualified contractors
Construction delays and cost overruns are of-
ten traced to inexperienced contractors who fail 
to live up to their “low bid.” In 2009, Albany au-
thorized cities to pre-qualify public works con-
tractors based on credentials, experience and past 
performance, thus ensuring that selected contrac-
tors are capable of providing quality construction. 
While the DDC, HPD, DOT and DoITT have be-
gun to implement pre-qualification lists for se-
lect contracts, thus far the emphasis has been on 
reducing the length of the procurement process. 
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Moving forward, pre-qualification lists should be 
used for more complex projects with a focus on 
screening out unqualified candidates incapable of 
honoring their “low bid.” 
 “Low bids” also become inflated when they 
underestimate the cost of relocating underground 
utilities for a project. To avoid these oversights, 
the State Legislature authorized “joint-bidding” 
in Lower Manhattan. This practice requires bid-
ders to provide separate prices for municipal and 
private utility work, with the contract awarded to 
the lowest responsible bidder for the combined 
work. Utility companies, by separate agreement, 
reimburse the City for additional costs if the low 
bidder on the municipal work is not the same as 
the low bidder on the combined work. To avoid 
cost overruns and delays, these provisions should 
be extended to the rest of the city. 
Reduce the time to design and approve con-
struction contracts
As they develop new sources of funding, city 
and state officials should also take immediate 
steps to address the high cost of building. The 
cost of construction is extremely high across the 
board in New York City, but public projects are in 
a league of their own. They take much longer to 
complete and cost consistently more than similar 
work in the private sector. The city could start by 
reducing the time it takes to design and approve 
construction contracts, particularly for smaller 
projects and those with a history of on-time and 
on-budget construction. For any project over 
$25,000, agencies typically need approvals from 
the Office of Management and Budget, the City 
Comptroller, the Law Department, the Depart-
ment of Finance and the Mayor’s Office of Con-
tract Services. This exhaustive process can last 
anywhere from 162 days to two years. Introduc-
ing procurement software that allows agencies to 
simultaneously, rather than sequentially, review 
proposals could expedite approval. The city’s En-
vironmental Quality Review process is another 
source of expensive delays that could be avoided 
if the city adopted time limits on reviews similar 
to those at the state level.   
Renew Project Labor Agreements
The city should renew project labor agree-
ments (PLAs), which are due to expire on June 
30, 2014. These PLAs provide labor-cost certainty 
and exempt the city from the state’s Wicks Law, 
a cumbersome and expensive regulation that re-
quires agencies to issue separate contracts for 
plumbing, electric and HVAC on any construction 
project exceeding $3 million. 
Repeal the Scaffold Law
Albany elected officials should repeal the na-
tion’s last remaining “Scaffold Law,” which signifi-
cantly inflates insurance costs compared to other 
states. The Scaffold Law holds builders respon-
sible for “elevation related” injuries regardless of 
fault. Determining compensation based on com-
parative liability, as is done in most other states 
across the country, could save agencies like the 
School Construction Authority tens of millions of 
dollars in insurance premiums every year. 
Improving Infrastructure Planning
Create a more effective capital planning process
With at least $34.2 billion in unfunded infra-
structure needs, New York will have to make in-
telligent choices about which projects to fund and 
which can be delayed. To do that effectively, the 
de Blasio administration should invest in a more 
accurate and complete survey of the city’s state 
of good repair needs and commit to funding fu-
ture projects based on explicit and rigorous social 
and economic goals rather than historical prec-
edent. It also should go beyond OMB and involve 
planning and economic development agencies to 
a greater extent than has been the case. The ad-
ministration might draw lessons from the MTA 
and Port Authority. The MTA has significantly re-
formed its asset management strategy in recent 
years, favoring component rather than full sys-
tems replacement and introducing sophisticated 
cost, risk, performance and resource analysis 
through the new Strategic Assets Lifecycle Value 
Optimization program. The Port Authority too has 
refined its capital planning using a “comprehen-
sive planning process and risk-based prioritiza-
Center for an Urban Future Caution Ahead60
tion that considered asset condition, operational 
and revenue impact, threat assessment, customer 
service, regional benefit, and regulatory or statu-
tory requirements.” 
Establish a more accurate and thorough survey 
of the city’s infrastructure assets and their state 
of good repair
Each year, the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) releases the Asset Information 
Management System (AIMS) report surveying 
city-owned buildings, parks, bridges and piers 
and detailing the investment needs of individual 
city assets. The inspections are incomplete and 
the report cursory. It excludes the city’s water 
and sewer systems, public housing and East Riv-
er bridges, among other things. It also overlooks 
handicap accessibility, asbestos abatement and 
modernization measures. Those assets that are 
surveyed are subject to only visual inspections, 
without any probing or specialized equipment. 
High-quality capital planning depends on 
a high-quality assessment of conditions. This is 
especially important for smaller agencies, which 
cannot afford rigorous inspections by private con-
sultants. Assessment data should be open to the 
public, allowing residents to track the city’s prog-
ress toward state of good repair, identify funding 
gaps and recommend more effective capital in-
vestment management strategies. 
Better align infrastructure investments with 
economic development goals
When individual agencies and authorities de-
velop their capital plans they don’t normally con-
sider the city or state’s broader economic devel-
opment goals. The MTA’s projected investment in 
a new train storage facility in Long Island City, 
for example, is based largely on the operational 
needs of the agency, not the development oppor-
tunities of the surrounding business district and 
neighborhood. Other cities and states have begun 
to invest in initiatives that better align these oth-
erwise distinct spheres of deliberation and plan-
ning. The Oregon Business Plan initiative, for ex-
ample, has led to strategic investments in bridges 
and transit infrastructure as a part of a broader 
plan to increase exports. Unlike a citywide capital 
plan or attempts to align capital plans across dif-
ferent agencies and authorities, this approach has 
the benefit of linking specific infrastructure proj-
ects with human capital investments to achieve 
important and measurable economic goals.
Take a census of underground utilities
In 2010, the MTA inspector general investi-
gated cost overruns on the Second Avenue Sub-
way and found that the discovery and rerouting 
of public utility lines drove up costs by more than 
$80 million and delayed the line’s completion by 
at least six months. To prevent future confusion 
and construction delays, New York needs to take 
a citywide census of public utility lines. The tech-
nology to perform this survey is already available. 
Con Edison experimented with Ground Penetrat-
ing Radar (GPR) around the World Trade Center 
site and along 149th Street and Southern Boule-
vard in the Bronx, discovering old trolley tracks 
running along high-voltage transmission lines. 
Because the radar is expensive, there should be a 
central repository of images, allowing public and 
private entities to pool their findings to assemble 
a comprehensive map. 
Developing Infrastructure Innovations
Expand the MTA’s Small Business Mentoring 
Program
Beyond funding and track access, the greatest 
impediment to updating MTA’s signal system is 
the dearth of qualified contractors. Only three to 
four contractors are qualified to install and mod-
ernize signals. This limits competition, increases 
expenses and caps the amount of signal replace-
ment that can be performed at any one time. To 
address this, the MTA recently began a small 
business mentoring program for training contrac-
tors. It should expand this program.
Invest in real-time bridge sensor technologies
Every year, New York City bridges are thor-
oughly inspected and assessed. Their condition 
ratings alert the city Department of Transporta-
tion to the most distressed bridges, helping them 
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prioritize capital and maintenance needs for the 
coming years. While these inspections are known 
for their rigor, they are also time-consuming, ex-
pensive and inherently limited, relying on visual 
inspections that often identify problems only af-
ter internal cracking has occurred and rebar cor-
rosion has begun. Oregon is piloting a real-time 
bridge sensor program. The sensors monitor tem-
perature and moisture, collect chloride concen-
trations at multiple depths within the concrete 
and assess corrosion. New York’s city and state 
departments of transportation should invest in 
these technologies as well.
Lease space on city street lights, traffic signals 
and pay phones for telecom company cell sites 
New Yorkers in every borough are hampered 
by patchy cell service and slow mobile broad-
band. In the city’s dense neighborhoods, signals 
often are blocked by buildings, water and reflec-
tive glass. To circumvent these physical barri-
ers, telecom companies are shifting to “small cell 
technology,” opting for cell sites close to street 
level rather than macro towers on top of build-
ings. Companies like Verizon are considering all 
available locations, including payphones, street-
lights and traffic lights. The city should rent these 
spaces to telecom providers, tapping into a new 
source of income while improving cell service. 
The new revenue source could be dedicated to the 
Economic Development Corp.’s ConnectNYC pro-
gram, which provides fiber internet connectivity 
in commercial districts.
Reassign agency tech engineers to DoITT
In October 2010, Mayor Bloomberg issued Ex-
ecutive Order 140, a plan to consolidate the city’s 
outmoded and fractured IT systems. The Depart-
ment of Information Technology and Telecommu-
nications (DoITT) would assume control of data 
storage, application hosting, procurement and 
technology policy. Thus far, progress has been 
slow.  City agencies have been reluctant to relin-
quish control over their tech operations, forego-
ing efficiency gains from centralized procurement 
and storage. To expedite this process, technical 
employees responsible for infrastructure in in-
dividual agencies should be reassigned to DoITT. 
There they would work on modernizing and in-
tegrating the city’s old and fragile information 
technology systems. Such an ambitious effort to 
overhaul tech infrastructure could attract young 
engineers to replace those currently maintaining 
legacy systems who are nearing retirement. 
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